The Decline of Europe and the crisis of the Left – part III

The document “The Decline of Europe and the crisis of the Left” was discussed and voted on, at the end of the 3^rd conference of Internationalist Standpoint (ISp) which took place between March 30 and April 3, 2025.

Following the tradition established by ISp from its inception, we avoid rewriting the documents in order to have them updated. Our emphasis is more on the description of processes rather than a summary of events and statistics.

When updates are required on specific issues, we prefer to produce separate resolutions. This is what we did, for example, with the resolution on the impact of Trump’s election.

The initial draft of the present document was prepared in the period November and December of 2024, and that is the reason why some of the facts, figures and developments described are a few months’ old. Where an update was necessary, we did it in the form of a footnote.

The document will appear on ISp’s website in three parts. (You can read Part I here and Part II here.)

Consciousness and the Left

86. The general landscape from the point of view of the working class and the struggling masses in Europe is full of contradictions: there is a general negative background, a retreat in struggle and consciousness compared to previous epochs, but within this general picture there are important developments and processes taking place (one can say of a “molecular character”) that point to the future and prepare major changes.
87. The general picture is determined to a large extent by two important events, of a negative character for the working class, in the last few decades. The first one is the capitalist restoration in the Soviet Block, which has been more extensively analysed in past material [2023 conference document]. The second is the inability of the working class and the straggling masses to face up to the challenges posed by the 2007-8-9 great recession. Both of these events, particularly the first, represented serious defeats for the mass movements.
88. The capitalist restoration in the East opened a period of negative developments as regards class struggle and class/socialist consciousness globally – this was particularly intense in the course of the 1990s, a very hard period for Marxist ideas and organizations. These began to be partially overcome towards the end of the decade, with the emergence of the anti-globalization movement, starting from Seattle, at the end of the Millenium. The 2000s were a period of rising struggles and consciousness. Though socialist ideas and the socialist perspective were still weak and distant, a new generation of fighters was entering the scene.
89. The collapse of the Communist Parties and the complete capitulation of the old reformist Social-democratic parties, which adopted and implemented neoliberal policies (Labour in the UK, PS in France, SPD in Germany, PSOE in Spain, PDS-DS and later PD in Italy, etc) created a vacuum in the Left. This, together with the rising social struggles, were reflected, in the course of the 1990s and 2000s, in the emergence of a number of “new left parties”, like the PRC in Italy, Respect in Britain, SSP in Scotland, PtB in Belgium, SP in the Netherlands, Die Linke in Germany etc. The anticapitalist Left had launched some initiatives that looked promising, like the NPA in France, and was able to build significant forces in some cases, especially in the cases of the SP and PBP in Ireland. New movements were on the rise: antifascism/antiracism, anti-globalization, feminism and anti-sexism, environment etc.
90. The 2007-8-9 economic crisis seemed like the turning point that could push class struggle and class consciousness to new highs and in a more clearly socialist direction, on a mass basis. This perspective proved wrong. We had mighty struggles, particularly with the Arab revolutions in North Africa (known as “Arab Spring”) and Southern Europe’s “debt crisis” that gave rise to monumental struggles, especially in Greece. But these movements were defeated.
91. Reflected on the political front, these conditions created or gave mass dimensions to a second generation of parties of the “New Left” – of the kind of SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Left Block in Portugal, etc. They also led to the rise of the Corbyn and Sanders phenomena in Britain and the US respectively. The first part of the 2010s seemed to revive Left Reformism, as a mass phenomenon, on an international scale. But by the end of the decade, and despite a new wave of social explosions and revolutions in many ex-colonial countries, particularly in 2019, and the emergence, with a new dynamic, of the new movements against misogyny, sexism and the climate crisis, they had all capitulated and sold out. In this way the 2010s brought a “double defeat” – both on the level of TU and social struggles and on the political level. The Covid crisis also had the effect of cutting across struggles that were developing, especially around climate change.
92. The impact of these defeats is still felt today. At the same time there are many elements that are pushing consciousness forward, in a radical, left, and in the final analysis, socialist direction – but the processes are slow. There is massive anger in big sections of European societies. The mass of the population is fed up with empty promises and never-ending austerity and neoliberal policies. Precariousness is becoming more and more the dominant form of labour relations. Unemployment is “low” only because underemployment is high. Living standards have been eroded by inflation. Social services are being continuously attacked and privatized. The war in Gaza is exposing the criminal policies and the hypocrisy of the European powers. The attack on democratic rights, on the right to protest, demonstrate and even speak, using “antisemitism” as the pretext, is increasing the anger. These blend with the new movements of the recent period, feminism, LGBTQ+ and environment. The rise of the far-right parties and the neo-fascist groups, acts as a trigger to alert large sections of society, particularly the youth, to do something about it. These conditions are preparing struggles and big leaps in consciousness at a later stage.

Reformism – old and new

93. Historical experience about the role of Reformism has been abundant from the time of the first world war (WWI) to the Russian Revolution, to the interwar period, especially France and Spain in the mid-1930s, to the post WWII and in recent decades. Reformist parties not only abandon their claimed aim of “peacefully” creating a socialist society, but they betray the labouring masses and lay the ground for the return of reaction. Reaction, under conditions of deep crisis, can take the vicious form of the rise or re-emergence of the far right and fascist organisations. It also leads to the crisis of the organisations of the working class, political as well as trade union.
94. These lessons were never learned by the new reformist parties of the “New Left”, created in the post-Stalinist era, in the vacuum that was created by the capitulation of Social Democracy to capitalist neoliberalism and the collapse of the Stalinist, so called “Communist”, parties. The profound retreat in consciousness and organisation of the working class in Europe deepened further during the Great Recession of 2007-9 and resulted in a widespread retreat of all organisations within the workers’ movement, starting with the trade unions which increasingly interpreted their role as representing “one of the factors of production” and thus merely subsidiary to capitalist production. In this context, several historically reformist parties have essentially departed from the framework of the workers’ movement, whereas the New Left while often adopting a broad “anti-system”, or “progressive” stance, does so in a general and abstract way, without concrete references to the role of the working class and the overcoming of the present mode of production.  
95. Europe provided the breeding ground for the emergence of a multitude of such, “new reformist” parties in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s which, in the huge majority of cases, failed to provide a perspective. It is valid to argue that today in Europe the vacuum in the Left has never been worse since the beginnings of the 20th century. Today the huge majority of mass left parties refuse to even mention the word “socialism” or even “nationalisation”. Inevitably, also, they fail to provide leadership in any consistent and fighting way to the struggles of the working class and the youth.
96. These factors have a decisive impact on the consciousness of the working class. The general level of class and socialist consciousness today is very low compared to previous epochs. As a result, we have a generalised crisis in working class organisations, on all levels, impacting on society and the mass movements.
97. This is something that will inevitably change: the severity of the economic crisis, the prospects and dynamics of military confrontations, the depth of the climate crisis, etc, are causing a clear crisis of hegemony among the ruling classes and fostering a widespread common awareness of the need for radical responses. We see many signs of the “search” inside labouring masses and the youth, a significant support for “socialist ideas” in general, albeit in a confused and blurred way, a defence of nationalized public utility companies against privatisations, etc. But as mentioned before, the processes are slow.
98. We have also seen that the broad masses, workers and youth, again and again, gave a huge impetus to new political formations whenever one such was on the horizon. This shows the huge potential which exists, and which is blocked by the weakness, retreat of consciousness and divisions inside the working class, coupled with the role of the leaderships in the New Left and in the trade unions.
99. The situation with the crisis of the working-class organisations and the general consciousness is in a number of ways worse in Europe than on other continents. The main reason for this is that the parties of the Left have been repeatedly tried in government and have failed in the past decades. This goes back to quite a long time, starting with the mass SD and Communist parties before the capitalist restoration in the ex-Stalinist states and then with the “new” reformism of the New Left. Europe was traditionally the epicentre of the development of the working-class organisations and ideas, but today it’s lagging behind developments in the Americas and other parts of the planet, in Asia and Africa. This does not mean that this picture won’t change again in the future.

Greece

100. In the European context, following the recession of 2007–2009 and during the sovereign debt crisis, the rise of SYRIZA to government in Greece and the “OXI” in the 2015 referendum exemplified for large masses across the continent the possibility of breaking with austerity policies and outlining a systemic change. Resistance, in other words, seemed not only possible but also capable of imposing a different approach to managing the economic crisis. The capitulation of SYRIZA in 2015, when its leadership undertook to apply the policies demanded by the Troika, not only dashed the hope and expectations of millions, nationally and internationally, but also made an overall left alternative to the ruling classes less credible.
101. The outcome for the New Left was disastrous; and the impact on the mass movements huge. The Italian and Greek mass movements, despite their traditions of struggle and revolutions, have not yet recovered from the defeat and betrayals of the leaders of the parties of the New Left.
102. Syriza’s capitulation in 2015 led to multiple fragmentations. None of them was able to form a sizeable left alternative – the vast majority went into crisis in the years that followed their split. The climax of SYRIZA’s degeneration was the election of Kasselakis, to the leadership of SYRIZA. Kasselakis is a multi millionaire shipowner, who used to live in the US before coming to Greece in order to contest the leadership. What allowed this individual to claim the leadership of SYRIZA was not only the right-wing political course of SYRIZA but also the bonapartist regime established by Tsipras and the leadership majority in the party. The leader of the party, was not voted by delegates to the Congress, elected by party organisations, but by the broad supporters of the party – so, individuals could become “members” just by paying 2 euros as an annual due and vote for the president. The gay and lesbian community mobilized to vote for the first gay person to lead a mass political party in Greece and thus Kasselakis found himself leading a party in which he never belonged. Not even the right wing of the party could stomach this – the result was a second wave of splits, with SYRIZA now standing at 5% according to polls. Among other things, this also shows the tragic but also comic role that Identity Politicscan play when put to the test.

Italy

103. Italy has been home to one of the most significant Communist Parties in the world and one of the most prominent left-wing movements in Europe. Even in the 1980s, despite the capitulations of the Italian CP and the unions (the “historic compromise” and incomes policy) they were still able to influence mass struggles (such as the sliding wage scale; anti-Euromissile and anti-nuclear movements; grassroots committees in schools and transportation; student movements in 1985 and 1989). The dissolution of the PCI and the emergence of a right-wing reformist party (PDS/DS) created the space for the recomposition of the Left. The PRC (Party of Communist Refoundation) reached around 100,000 members (by 2006) and garnered between 4.5% and 6% of the vote, having peaked at 8.5% in 1996. It played a significant role in the workers’ resurgence of the early 1990s, the anti-globalization movement and the labour conflicts of the early 2000s (FIOM and redundancy law).
104. The trajectory of the PRC was marked by various internal contradictions: between Stalinist and anti-Stalinist factions; between a “democratic alliance” and an alternative pole to the “two Rights” (centre left and right); between a “communist” orientation and a radical left approach. The decision to join the government (2006) and move beyond a “communist” profile (Rainbow Left) led to the parliamentary disaster of 2008, with the Left excluded from Parliament. Precisely when the hegemony of the ruling classes was being eroded by the crisis, there was no point of reference for social resistance. The reformist DS abandoned all ties with the working class, founding a liberal “progressive” party (PD under Veltroni and Renzi). The PRC split between “communist” factions and the radical left (2009).
105. Those years witnessed a heavy defeat for the working class, with the separate agreements on contracts in 2009 (disarticulation of collective bargaining), FIOM’s capitulation at FIAT (followed by the collapse of the “social coalition” in 2015 and the poor 2016 contract renewal), and Renzi’s attack (nominally from the Democratic Party). The profile of the Italian Left was profoundly altered. This led to the rise of the Five Star Movement and the consolidation of a reactionary bloc in 2018/2019. The Left retained a vanguard of tens of thousands of activists: the alternative networks with a reduced electoral appeal (1-2% of votes, often coalesced into unlikely, temporary lists tied to individual figures) and a multiplicity of groups (including what remains of the PRC; the PCI, a neo-Stalinist and Togliattian formation; Potere al Popolo, a Stalinist and populist force; and the Bordigist circles leading SiCobas); the reformist left reconstituted in the Green-Red Alliance (AVS, sectors that split from the PRC to the right with the Greens). Amid all this, any reference to the working class, and often any real mass influence, has been lost.

Portugal, Spain, Germany

106. Spain, Portugal and Germany have also seen the rise of important parties of the New Left, in the past decades. They are all now faced with crisis. The common characteristic in all, as in the above-mentioned examples, is that they have taken part in bourgeois governments – in Spain and Portugal on a national level, in Germany on a federal-state level.
107. Taking part in a bourgeois government can only take place on the conditions of the ruling class. In conditions of deep capitalist crisis, the system has no room for pro-working-class reforms. But that is also the time when the ruling class needs left parties in order to be able to govern, precisely because its rule is questioned by the masses. So, the parties of the Left end up applying the policies demanded by the capitalists, acting as “fire-fighters” against workers’ struggles, ending up in crisis themselves, and preparing the ground for a return of reaction.
108. It is a tragic irony when “left” parties proclaim to be at the fore-front of the struggle against the far right when it is their policies that lay the ground for the FR’s rise. Spain, Portugal and Germany are characteristic examples of these processes. Vox in Spain only appeared in 2014, Chega in Portugal in 2019 and AfD in Germany in 2013. And they all had spectacular rise.

Bloco

109. Bloco de Esquerda (BdE – Left Bloc) was able to rise in the course of the 2010-5 debt crisis that shook southern Europe, from a small force, and to enter an alliance with the Socialist Party (and also the Communist Party and the Greens) of Portugal, to allow the SP to rule as a minority government. Their alliance continued after the next elections, those of 2019. The alliance collapsed in 2022, when the SP decided to aim for a majority government, so as not to depend on its left collaborators. In practice, the SP used the left parties, when it needed them to govern, and then ditched them. At its height in 2015 the Bloco had 19 seats in the Portuguese parliament, in the 2024 general elections it was down to 5. It is not an accident that the far-right party, Chega, was formed in 2019. Then, it got 1.3% of the vote, in the 2022 elections it received 7.15% and 12 seats. The vote for the Left Block was at 10.2% in 1015 and was the third largest party in parliament with 19 seats; it went down to 6.6% in the 2019 elections and to 4.6% in the 2022 elections with only 5 parliamentary seats. The 2022 defeat led to a change of leadership, with Mariana Mortágua, replacing Catarina Martins, seemingly attempting to push BdE to the left.

Podemos

110. Podemos (We Can) is famous for being created “through” the great movement of the Indignados that shook Spain in 2011 (part of the global “occupy movement” of the period). It was created in January 2014, by prominent academics and intellectuals. It stood for the first time in the Euroelections of 2014 and received 8% of the vote. One year later, in the general elections of 2015, it won 20.7% – the third-largest party, behind the People’s Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), thus breaking Spain’s traditional two-party system. In June 2016 it joined forces with the United Left to form the Unidos Podemos (United We Can) coalition. It received 21.1% of the vote, a slight increase compared to the previous election, failing to achieve its goal of overtaking the PSOE.
111. Soon after its creation Podemos moved more and more to the right. Pablo Iglesias, its most prominent leader, offered unequivocal support to Tsipras’ sell out after the summer of 2015, intensifying internal divisions in Podemos. The internal regime was described as “direct” democracy through the internet; members could supposedly “contribute” and “vote” on line, but this only meant that the leadership was entirely unchecked, taking whatever decision, they wanted, ignoring everything they did not agree with and without the base of the party having any means to change the policies or the leadership itself. By April 2019 Unidos Podemos was down to 14.3% and in November 2019 in a repeat election due to political deadlock, down to 12.8%. As a natural outcome of its right-wing trajectory, Unidos Podemos formed a government with the PSOE. Pablo Iglesias served as Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Social Rights until 2021… when he left politics! In July 2023 Podemos joined a new coalition, Sumar, led by Yolanda Diaz and received 12.4% of the vote (recent polls give Sumar round 10%). Essentially Podemos has no independent existence any more.

Die Linke

112. Diel Linke was created in 2007 through the unification of WASG in West Germany, that split from SPD, and PDS which had its base in East Germany. From its first participation in elections for the federal parliament it received a very good result, of 11.9% – making it the fourth largest party in the Bundestag. But Die Linke failed to provide a left alternative vision to the German working class, either in the West or in the East. It’s vote in 2013 fell to 8.6%, in 2017 it was slightly up, to 9.2%, but by 2021 it was down to 4.9%. It was under pressure from the Greens who increased their strength at its expense, but also from the far right AfD (created in 2013, but increased its support significantly after the refugee crisis of 2015-16) which undermined its support in East Germany, where Die Linke had its strongholds.

Sarah Wagenknecht

113. The case of BSW (Sarah Wakengnecht Alliance) mentioned earlier in the document, is worth attention. Sarah Wagenknecht split from Die Linke in October 2023, to create an alliance in her name and was far more successful than anyone could predict. BSW combines demands raised by the FR, especially on migration, combined with conservative ideas on feminist and LGBTQ+ issues, with demands for workers’ rights. She takes antiwar positions, criticizing the German government and the EU, both in relation to Ukraine and to the war on Gaza (criticizing Israel, supporting the creation of a Palestinian state).
114. SW claimed that she created BSW in order to stop the rise of the AfD, but nothing of the sort happened. The success of BSW is of course a reflection of the crisis of Die Linke – which has no clear positions on the Ukraine war or Palestine and takes part in the federal-state governments, applying neoliberal policies in a routine manner. BSW failed to attract the AfD electorate, gaining most of its votes from disillusioned SPD supporters and former Die Linke voters.[[1]]

Corbynism

115. The rise of Corbynism in the second part of the 2010s came as a surprise – of equal surprise and interest was the phenomenon of Bernie Sanders in the Democratic Party in the US. Corbyn took over the leadership of the British Labour Party (LP) and tried to give it a push to the left, but without being ready to come into open clash with the right wing. He failed and this allowed right wing reaction inside the LP to take back control, massacre the left of the party and expel even Corbyn. He however stood in the recent general elections (July 2024) and was elected to parliament. 
116. Today Corbyn is attempting an alliance with MPs who used to belong to the LP, to create some kind of a parliamentary oppositional group. This is completely inadequate. The conditions for a new working-class party in Britain do exist. And Corbyn could be a catalyst in its formation – but he has not been able to play this role due to his reformist constraints.
117. At the time of Corbyn’s leadership of the LP, Momentum was created as a broad organisation to provide support to Corbyn’s ideas both inside and outside the LP. It failed utterly, on the one hand because of its conservative right wing reformist ideas and on the other because of its completely bureaucratic top-down approach towards anybody who did not share the views of the leadership. Momentum showed once again that the potential which exists objectively for the creation of new left formations of a radical, if not openly socialist, character can be squandered by subjective factors, i.e. the role of the leadership.
118. Partly as a response to the war in Gaza and partly due to the further degeneration of LP, The Collective appeared towards the end of 2023, bringing together supporters of Corbyn, ex LP councillors, left independent candidates, groups and activists. The declared aim of the Collective is “Rebuilding A Mass Socialist Movement as A Foundation for A New Left Political Party”. It remains to be seen if it will be successful in the declared target. But it is another indication of how mature the objective situation is for the creation of broad, radical left organisations, to provide a way forward to the working class and the other oppressed layers of society.

“La France Insoumise” and the “New Popular Front”

119. One of the few major left formations in Europe which has not been tested, exposed and in crisis, despite facing big challenges and many internal problems, is La France Insoumise (LFI), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon (an ex-MP and minister of the French Socialist Party, from which he split in 2008). LFI combines radical left demands and slogans with mobilizations on the street, a nationalist programmatic framework and an essentially reformist approach. Created in 2016 it continues to grow in support. In the 2017 presidential elections, Mélenchon won the highest vote for a candidate to the left of the Socialist Party (PS) in the post WWII period. In 2022, he reached 22%, narrowly missing (by 1.2% of the vote) running against Macron in the second round.
120. In the 2024 general elections in France (June 30 and July 7) LFI took the initiative for the creation of the Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front – NFP) an alliance between the LFI the Socialist Party (PS), the French Communist Party, the Greens and other smaller forces. This alliance first came into being in 2022 to contest the legislative elections, under the name NUPES (New Popular Union). The creation of the NPF was in response to Macron calling snap elections after the crashing defeat of his electoral list in the EU elections of 9 June 2024. In these elections Marine Le Pen’s RN came first with 31.37% of the vote, while Macron’s list (L’EE) won less than half of that, 14.60%. Macron attempted to move fast, immediately calling snap elections to take his opponents by surprise and make use of the usual “lesser evil” blackmail: “vote for me against the extremists”. The NFP, including the LFI, participated in a democratic front in the second round, withdrawing its own candidates and urging people to vote for Marcon’s candidates. Le Pen was indeed defeated in this way, the NFP won 178 seats, Macron’s camp 162, and RN 142.
121. Macron refused to give the mandate to form a government to the NFP, despite its prevalence, by making use of his parliamentary numbers and his presidential bonapartist powers. He appointed a minority government of his own choice, under prime minister Michel Barnier, who comes from the traditional Right (Republicans) – with the support of Marine Le Pen. This led to mass demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in protests, called by the NFP. The Bernier government fell in early December due to an NFP no-confidence motion also voted by RN, to be replaced after a few weeks by a Bayrou government with the same political set-up. French instability will thus continue in the coming months, precipitating new elections in the next period or even early presidential elections.
122. Despite the “radical” face and “reputation” that LFI has, partly due to the attacks against it by the ruling class, it is not a Marxist organisation, it cannot even be described as an anticapitalist one. It does not describe itself as a party but as a “movement” and as a “network” and it does not aim at the overthrow of the capitalist system; it essentially wants to implement reforms to make it “better”, more humane – the standard illusion of reformism. The parties it has aligned itself with in the NPF, particularly the SP, but also the PCF and the Greens, have been tested in previous times and have shown that they are not willing to enter any major confrontation with the French ruling class, to question the capitalist system in any way. Moreover, LFI reiterates the approach of the New Left parties, defending a supposed French social model, with no explicit reference to the role of the working class and with no reference to any class internationalism.
123. Apart from the political programme and physiognomy of LFI, there is another crucial deficiency, and that is the undemocratic character of LFI (and also of NPF). LFI is a top-down organisation, without any real control of the general political line or of Mélenchon, by the membership (estimated to around 400,000).  
124. LFI in the last two years, precisely at the moment when the war in Ukraine has ushered in a new phase of inter-imperialist conflict, has proposed a tactic of broad alliances within the “progressive” front that, in both name and substance, explicitly recalls the Popular Front of the 1930s. The NLF as well as its predecessor, NUPES (Nouvelle Union Populaire Écologique et Sociale) include not only forces from the workers’ movement that have previously shown they are unwilling to engage in a serious confrontation with the French ruling class (such as the PCF), but also forces that now fully align with the “progressive” bourgeois wing (the Greens and the PS). In doing so, LFI is theoretically and politically repeating the same mistakes made 90 years before. It’s no coincidence that last September (2024) LFI voted in the European Parliament to approve the use of European weapons to target military objectives in Russia.
125. The political programme of the NFP (and of NUPE before that) includes demands like: the freezing of oil, gas and food prices; increased wages; fewer hours of work; lowering the retiring age; increasing taxes on the rich and on corporations; increased spending on welfare and social services; abolishing nuclear power and fossil fuels; against racism and for the rights of migrants and refugees; support for women’s and LGBTQ+ rights; revision of the constitution to abolish the president’s extreme/bonapartist powers, etc. These demands raise the hostility of the French ruling class, which evidently consider Mélenchon much more unpredictable and dangerous than Marine Le Pen. Despite the –not particularly radical– reformist character of LFI’s programme, it would be impossible to implement it within the framework of an interclass alliance and under capitalism, due to the fierce opposition of the French (and international) bourgeoisie.
126. Despite this strategy and despite its inability to offer an alternative direction to trade union struggles, such as the movement on pensions, LFI and NPF, in the present conjuncture, are seen by the masses as providing a perspective, both on the level of day-to-day struggles and protests and also politically to challenge the centre right government and the far right. As a result, LFI has very significant support in the French working class, the youth and the social movements.
127. The NFP was built on the basis of bringing together the “democratic/progressive” forces to oppose the Far Right from winning the government. But if the NFP was in a position to form a government itself, all its internal contradictions would come to the surface with explosive force. Faced with the determined opposition of the ruling class to the reforms it wants to get through, the NFP would have the choice of compromising (i.e. abandoning its programme) or collapsing. The NPF is thus an unstable formation.
128. The complexity of the current political dynamic, the general political weakness of the working class, the weakness of class-based and revolutionary forces, and the gap between mass consciousness and the reality of the Popular Front strategy, create a space for various political and electoral tactics in the next period – from providing the NFP with conditional electoral support to building an alternative front to the NFP.
129. The anticapitalist Left is split over the approach towards LFI. Big sections of the anticapitalist Left stand in opposition to LFI and especially NPF, but others provide support and/or join. The most sizeable anticapitalist group in France, NPA (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste – New Anticapitalist Party) split over this (and a number of other important issues) in December 2022. The split divided NPA in two, with about 700 members on each side, one joined the NPF, the other (NPA Revolutionaire) refused to even call for a vote to it.  
130. Beyond any political or electoral tactics, for Marxists, a principled political position against the creation of the French “popular front”, and more specifically for the inclusion of the SP in it, is necessary: historically, a popular front is a “strike breaking mechanism”, to use Trotsky’s expression – and thus, it will create the conditions for the return of right-wing reaction. This criticism ought to be directed towards the LFI which was the key force behind it and for failing to draw the lessons of the failed experience of the Popular Front of the 1930s. The goal must always be to convince through patient explanation. Critical political action means fighting for the full implementation of the mass movement’s demands adopted in the NFP’s program, emphasizing that achieving this requires the full autonomy and political independence of the working class on a clear perspective of system change.
131. Within this framework, any tactic of conditional support or entryism is possible, aiming at building the Marxist forces and when possible, break the class-conciliationist dynamics of the Popular Front.
132. The mass sentiment calling for unity to counter the Far Right must neither be denied nor opposed. In a context,

“…where the world economic crisis is worsening; unemployment is growing; in almost every country international capital has gone over to a systematic offensive against the workers… there is a new mood among the workers – a spontaneous striving towards unity, which literally cannot be restrained… The new layers of politically inexperienced workers just coming into activity long to achieve the unification of all the workers’ parties and even of all the workers’ organisations in general, hoping in this way to strengthen opposition to the capitalist offensive” [Theses on the United Front, Executive Committee of the Comintern, December 18, 1921].

This general observation was true in the 1920s and 1930s, when the masses were organized in reformist parties and unions, and it remains true today, even though this kind of organisation does not exist.

“The united front tactic is simply an initiative whereby the Communists propose to join with all workers belonging to other parties and groups and all unaligned workers in a common struggle to defend the immediate, basic interests of the working class against the bourgeoisie”.

The united front policy operates, therefore, within a mass and class dimension, involving all forces of the workers’ movement and the left, in social action, and aiming to develop united organizational bases among the masses (strike committees, co-ordinations, self-organized assemblies, etc.). The united front tactic is an exact opposite of inter-class popular fronts.

133. Marxists in France would have a duty to raise this criticism to LFI, even though in a careful and sensitive way, given the support LFI/NPF have in the working class, the immigrants, the youth, etc. The aim should always be to convince through patient explanation. However, taking a principled position towards the NPF is different from the tactics to be followed towards LFI or the NPF. A certain orientation to these forces would be necessary because they attract (see below), big numbers of working-class and youth activists and supporters. The size, however, of a Marxist organisation is another important factor in deciding such tactics. For a very small revolutionary group, probably the best tactic would be to enter LFI – its structures allow this. But irrespective of the size and the practical tactical details, which cannot be decided from afar (as we have no organisation in France) and which should be a matter of open-minded discussion, the application of the “method” of the united front towards LFI, i.e., collaborating and working together with its rank-and-file activists would be necessary.

The Anticapitalist Left

France

134. There are countries in which the anticapitalist Left is playing an important role in the working class, and the social movements and a number of cases where it came close to the creation of sizeable new left formations, but in the end failed to significantly change the landscape of the Left.
135. One of the most important countries where organisations that have a reference to Trotsky played an important role in the past, is France. NPA, already mentioned, had raised the hopes of many activists at its creation, in February 2009, counting 9,200 members at its inception. The “far left” had played an important role in all the movements of the French workers and youth from the 1960s to the present day. In the presidential elections of 2002, the candidates of the Trotskyist Left received between themselves 10.44% of the total vote! In the 2007 elections they received 7% – significantly lower from 2002 but still big, indicative of the potential that existed objectively.
136. The initiative for the creation of NPA was taken by the largest of the Trotskyist organisations, LCR (Revolutionary Communist League) associated with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USFI). NPA was a broad formation aiming to bring together the fragmented French anticapitalist Left. The idea was correct, but it was applied in a wrong way. Following the tactics that characterize the USFI internationally, the LCR diluted itself in the NPA. This meant that they had abandoned the aim of having an organized revolutionary nucleus at the centre of NPA (as a broad formation). NPA, therefore, was bound to end up in adventures (opportunist or sectarian). LCR demanded that all groups that decided to join NPA ought to also liquidate themselves before joining. This is a crucial mistake, because it does not recognise the need for revolutionaries to be organised within broader left formations which, otherwise, would tend to be reformist, left reformist or centrist depending on circumstances, but certainly not revolutionary.
137. The rise of Mélenchon as a powerful left personality, building around him broad left alliances and standing in the presidential elections from 2012 onwards, immediately created divisions and splits in NPA because of the latter’s decision to stand on its own instead of seeing itself as part of an electoral agreement.
138. These divisions became even more acute around the presidential elections of April 2022. In the first round Macron came first with 27.85%, Marine Le Pen second with 23.15% and Jean-Luc Mélenchon third with 21.95% – i.e. Mélenchon lost to Le Pen by 1.2% and was thus out of the race of the 2^nd round. The first round featured several left candidates, representing the Greens (Jadot, 4.63%), PCF (Roussel, 2.28%), PS (Hidalgo, 1.75%), as well asthe Trotskyist candidates of NPA, F. Poutou, and of Loute Ouvrier (LO – Workers’ Struggle) N. Artaud. NPA and LO received 0.77% and 0.56% respectively, i.e., 1.33% in total. This is higher than the difference between Lepen and Melencon. Had the two Trotskyist organisations called for a vote for Mélenchon in the context of an electoral agreement the second round of the presidential elections would probably take place between Macron and Mélenchon, instead of Macron and Lepen. Mélenchon’s defeat led LFI in the direction of constructing the New Popular Front, primarily addressing its right, i.e., the Greens and the PS. These conditions inevitably increased pressures inside NPA, which split before the end of the same year. Particularly so as its vote in consecutive presidential elections was steadily falling: 1.15% in 2012, 1.09% in 2017 and 0.76% in 2022.
139. There is a clear class characteristic in the vote for Mélenchon, as is clear, e.g., from the 2022 presidential elections. Mélenchon got spectacular results in a number of working-class suburbs of Paris: 49.09% in Seine-Saint-Denis, 64% in La Courneuve, 55.22% in Montreuil, 53.83% in Pantin, 61.13% in Saint-Denis, 54.20% in Villepinte, 60% in Gennevilliers, etc. Overall, Mélenchon came first in terms of votes, in five of the eight departments of the Ile-de-France region surrounding Paris! Mélenchon was also first in the French Antilles in the Caribbean, he got 56.16% in Guadeloupe, 53.1% in Martinique, etc. The same was true with those who identify themselves as Muslim, taking 70% of their votes! He also won a majority among those voting for the first time in their lives and (according to a poll) he got 38.4% of the vote among voters aged 18-24. This pattern was repeated in the general elections of 2024. There’s a clear social dynamic around LFI and the method of the united front tactic towards it would be necessary, meaning the need to work together, build common campaigns, movements and local committees with its members.

Ireland

140. Ireland is exceptional in many ways. The two, semi massnew Left formations, with elected MPs, are linked to the Trotskyist space: the Socialist Party, coming from a CWI tradition (it split from CWI in 2021 and from the ISA in 2024) and the People Before Profit, coming from the British SWP tradition.
141. Ireland shows the potential. The SP in the past was able to lead great campaigns against water charges and against a tax on bin collections, among other, while some of its representatives were arrested and jailed because of the struggles they were leading. Thus, new militant class traditions were established. It remains to be seen if the SP and PBP will be able to sustain and increase their support in the next period.

Greece

142. In Greece, there is a strong presence of the anticapitalist Left, of all shades: Trotskyist, Stalinist, Maoist, and quite a number of a mixed or unclear character. The “Anticapitalist Left Alliance”, ANTARSYA, has been in existence in one form or another for more than two decades. At its height in the first half of the 2010s it had around 2500 activists and it was able to receive in elections up to 1.2% of the vote. ANTARSYA has a radical, anticapitalist programme, but is also sectarian in refusing to apply the united front approach and political-electoral alliances with other forces in the labor movement. It refused to do so in the late 2000s and early 2010s towards SYRIZA, when the latter could still be described as a party of the Left, and it refuses to do so still today even towards the KKE, not to mention Diem 25. ANTARSYA has the conception, in essence, that the united front approach relates only to organisations of the “revolutionary space”. It failed completely to utilize the crisis of Syriza after 2015 and as a result ended up in a big crisis itself, with repeated splits. At the last general election (June 2023), it received 0.3% (less than 16,000 votes) with abstention at a record heigh of around 50%.
143. The majority of anticapitalist left organisations do not take part in ANTARSYA. The Greek section of ISp, Xekinima, does not take part in ANTARSYA essentially for one main reason: its sectarian rejection of the united front and broader alliances with other left forces. However, in the local elections of October 2023, the broad anticapitalist space was forced to get together in many municipalities (including the major ones, Athens and Salonica) on one electoral list. The reason for this was a new law by the ND government that imposed a threshold of 3% for any party to win seats in local councils. This was in addition to many other obstacles, e.g. in the big municipalities one would have to present lists of more than 100 candidates in order to be eligible to stand… The collaboration of the anticapitalist Left brought a result that can only be described as historic: it received around 6% in Athens and Salonica, no less than 4% in anyone of the 15 municipalities where the alliance stood, and in one case 9%. The lessons however have not been drawn, the anticapitalist space remains multi fractured. But these local election results show the potential and the importance of the method of the united front and the development of a common political-electoral space for the Greek anti-capitalist Left.

Conclusions

144. One of the main points that needs to be brought home is that while understanding the complications, what is even more important is to understand the possibilities that exist in the present situation. There is huge anger in society and a great potential for revolutionary ideas, but it is dispersed, because of the role of the parties of the New Left and shortcomings of the Anticapitalist Left. There is big potential for revolutionary ideas, but unfortunately the majority of the Anticapitalist Left is characterized by sectarianism, a lack of sufficient connection with the working classes, and a refusal to work together in common campaigns, electoral alliances, common initiatives, etc.
145. The experiences of the past years and decades have shown that the working class and the youth will move again and again in an effort to build political organisations that defend their interests. In the course of all the big crises and events of the past three decades the masses turned to small left organisations (e.g. SYRIZA) or created new ones from the scratch (e.g. Podemos) and gave them mass support so that they could take power. But the result was mass demoralization because all of the parties of the New Left reject the revolutionary road, having illusions in a “humane” capitalism, and as a result capitulate to the pressures of the ruling class.
146. Any new left formations, which do not have a strong Marxist cadre at their core, will inevitably develop in a reformist direction and end up in disappointing working-class people, thus laying the basis for the return of reaction in more repressive and authoritarian forms.
147. The huge rise of the FR in the last couple of decades is directly linked to the failure of the parties of the Left, old and new, to show a way forward in conditions of economic and social crisis.
148. A new generation of left parties is inevitable in the next period, though this could take time because of the weight of previous defeats and disappointments. Marxists need to follow such processes closely in order to try to intervene and instil revolutionary Marxist ideas in their ranks. There are countries in which the Anticapitalist Left has sufficient strength to take initiatives in the direction of building broader left formations if only it agrees to work together in this direction. There is significant potential in a number of countries, which could act as an example for more to follow, if only the anticapitalist left organisations abandon the sectarianism that characterises most of them.
149. Internationalist Standpoint will continue to work on three levels as it has been doing through its inception in 2022:

a) to strengthen our forces;

b) to work together with other organisations, linked to the workers and the youth, in the context of the united front, to fight together on specific issues or in specific campaigns;

c) to build new fighting organisations of the working class, or new left formations, either by taking part in them if other forces take the initiative, or by taking the initiative ourselves together with other groups of the anticapitalist space. These should function on the basis of internal democracy and with full independence to the constituent parts.

At the same time, it will aim at deepening its relations with other revolutionary international organisations.

[1] In the federal elections of February 23, 2025, BSW failed to pass the threshold for entering the Bundestag (5%). In this election, the AfD was able to nearly double its votes, coming second with 20.8% to the Conservatives (Christian Democratic Union, CDU, and its sister Christian Social Union, CSU) who received 28.6%. Diel Linke was able to recover significantly winning 8.8%. This was partly due to a large mobilization by disillusioned ex-SPD and ex-Green voters to stop the FR – participation in the elections reached a record-breaking turnout of 82.5%.