The recent Irish general election result represents a significant setback for Sinn Fein. The party saw a 5.5% drop in its vote from a high point at the last general election in 2020 of 24.5%. In 2020 it ran too few candidates and was therefore unable to fully capitalise on its percentage share. It is widely accepted that it could have won up to 47 TD (or MP) seats, rather than the 38 it came home with. In this election Sinn Fein managed to return a similar number of seats as before and are now proclaiming this as a success. This is only accurate in the sense the result could have been even worse, given their performance in the local and European elections in June of this year (in the local elections, it scored only 12% of the vote).
In the aftermath of the 2020 election, Sinn Fein (SF) was the major opposition party to the coalition government of the traditional pro-capitalist parties, Fianna Fail (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), with the Green Party. The Coalition was deeply unpopular for long periods and Sinn Fein consistently topped the opinion polls. If it had sustained its lead and won the predicted share of the vote in the actual election, it would now be forming the next government, albeit in coalition with other smaller parties. Its confidence was palpable, and the idea that Sinn Fein would be leading governments in both the north and south of Ireland became widely accepted.
Coalition Parties Stabilise Vote, Sinn Fein Lose Momentum
One year ago, Sinn Fein began to drop in the opinion polls. There are several interrelated reasons for this. In part, it was because the government’s position stabilised as some factors turned in its favour. Fine Gael installed a new leader, Simon Harris, who was seen as youthful and forward looking. Fianna Fail began to pull back some of its traditional voters as memories of the savage cuts after the Great Crash began to fade. Paradoxically, the smallest coalition party, the Greens, suffered badly as opposition to the coalition government became increasingly centred around the environmental policies it was most closely associated with. The Greens took the hits, and Fine Gael and Fianna Fail were able to deflect blame.
In the run up to the election the coalition was further bolstered by a European Union ruling which meant a windfall of 14 billion euros in back taxes paid by major multinationals which had taken advantage of Ireland’s low tax regime over the previous 25 years. The sense that there was “money in the bank” reinforced support for the coalition from the significant minority of the population which has experienced real wages increase over the course of the last several years. This minority bloc was sufficient to deliver success for Fianna Fail and Fine Gail, even if the two parties together scored a lower share of the popular vote than at any time since the 1930s.
Thus, the right-wing parties successfully stabilised their voting base, against the anti-incumbent trend of 2024. They were further assisted by a low turnout, especially in working-class areas, the drop in Sinn Fein’s vote and the splintering of the anti-coalition vote in multiple directions.The centre-left Labour Party, which was decimated after its last time in government (2011-2016), made a relative comeback and gained seats. So too did the Social Democrats (a split from Labour). A large number of independents won seats, many of whom are ex-Fine Gael or ex-Fianna Fail members and will naturally take their place in a new coalition government with the two main parties. The Green Party were decimated, losing 11 of their 12 seats.
Vote Plateaued Whilst IRA Campaign Continued
Sinn Fein lost votes, some to its right, especially in where anti-immigration candidates mounted relatively strong campaigns, even if they did not seriously challenge for seats. It also lost votes to Fianna Fail, to Labour and Social Democrats, and to a right-wing split from Sinn Fein, Aontu.
Sinn Fein’s difficulties are deeply embedded in the contradictory force it has now become. The origins of modern Sinn Fein lie in the split in the Republican Movement (the umbrella term for the IRA, Sinn Fein, and associated organisation) in 1970, between the “Officials” and the “Provisionals”. The Provisionals split the movement accusing the leadership (soon to be known as the Officials) of moving in the direction of Marxism and of not being sufficiently prepared to defend Catholic areas with arms in 1969. Provisional Sinn Fein supported the Provisional IRAs military campaign from 1970 through to the first ceasefire in 1994, and then the second ceasefire in 1996.
In the 1970s Sinn Fein was not an electoral force. This changed during the 1981 hunger strike when Bobby Sands, the first hunger striker to die, won a by-election and became MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. It then began its long journey from armed struggle, to ceasefire, disarmament, and a place in government. Its strategy in the 1980s was summarised in the speech of one of its leaders, Danny Morrison, at the party’s Ard Fheis (Annual Conference) on 31 October 1981, when he said: “Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?”
By the late 1980s it was clear that its vote had hit a ceiling north and south. In the north, it could not get above 13% of the vote overall, or 40% of the Catholic vote. Its main nationalist rival, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), continued to outpace it, as many Catholics would not countenance voting for Sinn Fein whilst the IRA campaign continued. In the south of Ireland, it fared even worse. The Armalite had to go.
When it did, its electoral fortunes began to change. Within a few years Sinn Fein overtook the SDLP in Northern Ireland to become the largest nationalist Party and it is now the largest party overall. In 1997 Sinn Fein won its first seat in the Dail (in the modern era) in Cavan-Monaghan. In subsequent years it made considerable advances, especially in more deprived working-class areas in the cities, and in traditional Republican rural areas along the border and in Munster. By 2020 Sinn Fein, in effect, had a base everywhere. There was no constituency where they did not have a TD or could realistically hope to have a TD in 2024.
Sinn Fein’s Strategy
Sinn Fein’s strategy is to enter government north and south, and from this position of power to push for a referendum on Irish unity through the structures of the Good Friday Agreement. Under the Agreement, a referendum must be called by the British government if it appears that there is a reasonable prospect of a “yes” vote for unity. Sinn Fein’s argument, which is a strong one, is that if they hold power north and south, this will indicate that the population is moving in the direction of a yes vote and a poll should be called.
For 25 years Sinn Fein has built support around this prospect, setting target dates which come and go without remark (when for example, Gerry Adams said he expected a United Ireland by 2016, the 100th anniversary of the 1916 rebellion). But despite the missed deadlines, the party had a sense that everything was moving in its direction. This view was widely shared by many Catholics in the north of Ireland, especially younger Catholics in working-class areas.
Memories of the IRA campaign are now fading. It is 30 years since the first ceasefire and anyone under the age of 40 does not remember the reality of the IRA campaign. They do know of the sacrifice of the Republican Movement, however, and the repression inflicted on the Catholic community. 400 members of the Provisional IRA and other armed groups died and 15,000 went to prison. 2,000 were interned without trial. There were 40,000 destructive house searches in 1972 alone. 600 Catholic non-combatants were gunned down by Loyalist assassins and 200 were shot dead by British soldiers or the armed police force. The Catholic community of Northern Ireland was only half a million strong at the outset of the Troubles and the scale of the violence has left its mark. The state was a prison house, with rigged voting systems, and an apparatus of repression which was the envy of the apartheid regime. The Catholic community cannot forget and with no alternative on offer, continues to vote for Sinn Fein.
But just as the IRA campaign was a dead end, which could not succeed, or if it had succeeded would have resulted in a bloody civil war, a vote for Sinn Fein will not deliver. Sinn Fein does not improve the lives of its own voters in government, and a border poll will ultimately result in the coercion of Protestants, and more conflict. The Troubles has left its mark on the Protestant community also. It views the IRA campaign as deeply sectarian, and it too will not easily forget.
Most young people, from either community, have no awareness of the latent power of the organised workers movement in the late 1960s, which could have turned events in a different direction, or the movements led by the trade unions in the 1970s,1980s and 1990s, which prevented outright civil war. This lack of awareness is a barrier to those trying to rebuild the workers’ movement.
Riding Many Horses
For most Northern Catholics, the prospect of a united Ireland is linked closely to the aspiration for a better life. Sinn Fein’s vote in the south is much less about a united Ireland, though this is important for a segment of its support base, but is an expression of the anger of working-class people and the disillusionment of the young. But now the ability to mobilise votes on this basis is uncertain- the cost-of-living crisis and the housing crisis were the dominant issues in the election, yet Sinn Fein’s vote went down.
Sinn Fein can no longer count on onward growth in the south, and all their calculations have been upset. The difficulty for Sinn Fein is not that it is trying to ride two horses at once, but several horses moving in different directions.
For now, Sinn Fein’s base in the North seems impregnable. The 2019 local elections, however, give a clear sign that this may not always be the case. It lost seats in areas it would have considered safe, such as West Fermanagh and East Tyrone, to independent Republican candidates, often standing at least nominally to the left of Sinn Fein. It successfully took most of these seats back the following election, a testament to its organisational abilities, and above all, to the lack of an alternative on offer from left and other dissident Republicans who were elected.
However, it is increasingly obvious to its base that when in power Sinn Fein does not deliver. Today, Sinn Fein holds the First Minister position in Northern Ireland and sits in coalition government with the two main Unionist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, and the Alliance Party, which wins votes in both communities. It has little choice, by its own logic, but to continue to administer Northern Ireland and to accept the rules of the capitalist system in all its detail. This means it heads a government of austerity and of inequality. It implements the neoliberal agenda of the British government while trying to deflect blame onto that government. In its areas of greatest support, for example, the working-class estates of Derry and Belfast, there is no obvious improvement in living conditions or life chances since Sinn Fein joined in government 20 year ago.
It could get away with this by holding out the possibility of significant change just around the corner, but its setback in the southern election hollows out to that argument. If it seems likely there will be no general election in the South for five years. Sinn Fein will go to the next Northern Ireland Assembly election in two years’ time, with a record of right-wing governance and with no prospect in sight of a border poll and Irish unification. At this point, perhaps sooner or perhaps later, the contradictions will begin to eat into its electoral base.
The dynamics of Northern politics nevertheless point in the direction of Sinn Fein continuing as it is -in government and careful to build its reputation with the capitalist class. Thus, whilst it might talk left, occasionally, it acts right, consistently. It is not distinguishable from the other Assembly parties on economic issues.
In a world in turmoil, with no developing left pole of attraction, nationally or internationally, Sinn Fein could begin to haemorrhage votes to apathy and despair. Or new republican formations with a more militaristic approach and anti-Protestant positions, could develop support. Sinn Fein would then be tempted to move in a similar direction to protect its vote.
Only the redevelopment of the workers movement, and above all the creation of a mass party of the working class, drawing support from both communities, can cut across this development. The 2019 local election was also noticeable for the victory of an anti-sectarian socialist candidate in Enniskillen, Donal O’Cofaigh, a member of the Committee for a Worker’s International. He too lost his seat at the subsequent election, but his victory nevertheless demonstrates what could be achieved in the right circumstances with the correct approach.
A New Strategy or Same Course?
In the South Sinn Fein can best be described as a bourgeois nationalist party, with a very thin left veneer. It is attempting to become a party of government. It has formidable opposition in Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, but gains confidence from its eclipsing of the SDLP in the North.
It is only a left party in the sense that many of its voters consider it to be on the left. It is not a left party in its policies, and it does not originate in the workers movement. It can maintain a left facade because of its history of struggle and radicalism, but increasingly, the distant memory of the armed struggle is becoming insufficient for these purposes.
Sinn Fein tries to face many ways. It appeals to all classes, simultaneously winning votes amongst middle class layers with pro-capitalist policies, and amongst the working class with a hint of radicalism.
It appeals for votes based on the past violence of the IRA and simultaneously distance themselves from that violence and harshly attacks the current proponents of political violence, the dissident Republicans.
It will flip policies whenever necessary: it was until recently a fiercely anti-abortion party, summed up by the speech of a conference delegate at an Ard Fheis in the late 1980s who argued that the “taking of human life” is only defensible in cases of “self-defence and armed struggle”. In time, they stood this policy on its head in response to the shifting moods in society. Similarly, they were once an anti-European Union party but developed a pro-European Union position in response both to changes in sentiment in the wider population, but especially the requirements of the Irish and European capitalist classes.
In the last two years, Sinn Fein has moved sharply to the right on several issues. They have dropped their long-standing opposition to the Special Criminal Court in Dublin, which sits without a jury, and have moved to the right on the question of immigration, boasting that they would have a harder position on “defending Ireland’s borders” than the Coalition parties.
Talk Left, Prepare for Governing with the Right
The way forward for Sinn Fein is not entirely clear. It is engaged in rounds of internal discussions as it discusses its options. In the short term it has raised the idea of an immediate left government lead by Sinn Fein, but as this is impossible given the balance of forces in the Dail, without enthusiasm.
It is very possible that there will not be further general election in the south for the full five-year term of this government and given this it is likely that Sinn Fein will simply continue with “more of the same”. It will be a radical opposition when it is suits -promising more new homes than the other parties, for example- but will remain focused on reassuring the capitalist class that it represents no real threat to their interests. Whilst it talks about a left government, and will continue to do so, its real commitment is to power, and it will enter a coalition with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fail to achieve this.
Sinn Fein may regain momentum in the South, and the circumstances in which it might do so can be sketched out. The new coalition government will most likely be formed by Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, with several independents. It will commence governing with confidence, given that the Irish economy is growing, it has a large tax windfall to allocate, and a significant proportion of the population (perhaps 40 to 50%) believe that their lives are improving through wage growth, which is outpacing inflation.
This, however, is only one side of the picture. More than half of the population, who did not vote at all, or did not vote for the coalition, do not believe that their lives are improving. Their real wages are stagnant or falling, and the social wage (educational opportunities and health services provided by the state) are insufficient to maintain their lives or meet their aspirations. The housing crisis sits alongside the cost-of-living crisis as a seemingly insoluble problem, which is bearing down heavily on the lives of working-class people. In these circumstances and in the context of a world in turmoil, the coalition government will face one crisis after another, and the opposition parties will rise in the opinion polls.
One problem for Sinn Fein is that the recent growth of the Labour Party and the Social Democrats means that it is no longer the sole repository for opposition votes. With more TDs, both Labour and Social Democrats will have a higher profile. This is one reason why Sinn Fein has begun to talk up the idea of a left government -not because it is convinced that this is the best way forward, but because it understands the need to protect its left flank and to stay ahead of Labour and Social Democrats. It will use left phraseology, for this reason, but also adopt calculated positions to maintain its base in the more rightward leaning sections of the population. Sinn Fein may once again gain momentum, through a move to the left, or the right.
In Sinn Fein’s favour is Labour’s dire record when it was last in government -it often took the lead in imposing savage cuts- and its uninspiring program and leadership. This may place a ceiling in its support. Similarly, the Social Democrats, though they have a more youthful and a slightly more radical image than Labour, may struggle to inspire when the government runs into trouble.
It is possible that Sinn Fein will put forward more credible left policies for a prolonged period, and on this basis, may become the largest party at the next election. It may form a coalition government with a combination of Labour, the Social Democrats and the Greens. Despite this, the revolutionary left should be under no illusions. Sinn Fein is not a genuine left party and will not become one except in circumstances that are unlikely to occur.
The revolutionary left must consider how to relate to the support base of Sinn Fein, and to a developing sentiment in favour of a left government. Orientating to the idea of a left government, which for most equates to a Sinn Fein lead government, when Sinn Fein is not a left party in a meaningful sense, and acts as a divisive force in Northern Ireland, presents a significant challenge.
