The left does not die for whether it takes part in elections, or whether or not it intervenes in reality, but because of its reductionism of horizons.
By Vanessa Monteiro
This text takes as its starting point the death of the left1. This idea, announced over the last four years by Vladimir Safatle, generated, more than just controversy, defensive responses from sections of the left who felt offended by that statement. Despite activists who sincerely began to question whether their heroic efforts to intervene in the class struggle were being disregarded, some of the criticisms drew attention for reaffirming the diagnosis, such as the idea that the left is alive “because it won four consecutive presidential elections since 2002, and confirmed that it preserved its authority by taking Lula’s candidacy to the second round in 2022”2.
They did not understand, or did not want to understand, that the idea of the death of the left does not come from the fact that the left runs in elections or intervenes in the social reality, but from the reductionism of its horizons. As Safatle says, the left died as a proper left when it proved incapable of fulfilling its historical role and presenting a radical response to the climate emergency and the political-social collapse, leaving the anti-systemic political space, the programmatic dispute and the capacity to act on the people wide open to the fascists.
The death of the left occurs not as a conceptual abstraction, but as a real and historically located process. That is why I chose to write this text, elaborating on the reasons that led me to a new direction in my revolutionary militancy, framing the crisis of Resistencia [a group within PSOL] as an exemplary case of the junction at which the radical left finds itself today.
Five years after the establishment of the Resistencia, the deep transformation that the group has undergone towards institutionalisation is crystal clear. The project that originated Resistencia no longer exists, and its end cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon. Thus, I understand that this debate is justified by the fact that the political and programmatic differences regarding the direction of this organisation are not a singular heritage, but rather stem from lively debates that span social movements, revolutionary organisations and left-wing intellectuals, given the complexity of the situation we live in. Secondly, because addressing political differences in a frank and open manner is pedagogical in the midst of so many poorly explained or, even worse, silent splits and fragmentations. Nothing is more anti-Leninist than succumbing to the idea that an open and public debate is harmful3.
About the origins and foundational positions
Resistencia is a tendency of Trotskyist origin, mainly created by the merger between the former MAIS (Movement for an Independent and Socialist Alternative) and NOS (New Socialist Organization). MAIS emerged in July 2016, after 739 activists split with PSTU, who called for the formation of a new socialist and revolutionary organisation in Brazil through the manifesto “We must snatch (joy) from the future while we can”4. The split and manifesto caused a political event with huge repercussions on the left at the time. NOS, despite being smaller in size, brought together an important layer of Marxist intellectuals and activists, with particular influence in Rio de Janeiro state, at a time when the left in Rio was quite dynamic5. The merger of these two groups created Resistência in 2018, which formally joined the PSOL in the same year. The new organisation emerged with significant trade union work, presence in youth movement and a number of cadres belonging to the old school of Brazilian Trotskyism, including founders of the former CS (Convergencia Socialista) and the Workers’ Party (PT).
For those who, like me, came from the former MAIS, there was great expectation in the building of a new, non-dogmatic revolutionary organisation, capable of positively influencing the struggle against the fragmentation of revolutionaries based on the need to confront the rise of the far-right without giving up the building of an anti-capitalist alternative. The launching of the manifesto publicising the former MAIS on an old blog called Convergência has been done in the following terms: “The initiative seeks a superior unity of the left that moves towards the fight to overcome capitalism, and, in Brazil, for the formation of a third political camp, alternative to the old and new right-wings and to the coalition that supported the PT governments”6.
The manifesto contains the main ideas that guided the split with the former organisation, as well as the founding pillars that marked the programmatic profile of that group. The former MAIS correctly understood that the capitalist restoration in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and Cuba had a reactionary character, which explains the absence of triumphant revolutions in the 21st century, as a result of the political and organisational setback that struck the working class:
The political, economic, social, military and ideological offensive of imperialism, the propaganda about “the end of history” and the adaptation of the reformist left to the bourgeois order did not go without consequences. The mass movement regressed in its consciousness and organisation. And the revolutionaries suffered the effects of these years of confusion and crisis7.
Without catastrophism, we point out that history is not over and “the global economic crisis of 2007-2008 opened a new international situation marked by instability and political, social and military polarisation” (my emphasis)8. In this highly contradictory framework, marked by the rise of both the far-right and neo-reformist parties, leveraged by progressive phenomena of social mobilisation, we understand the task of acting in the face of a “new global situation [that] opens up important perspectives for socialists”9 but without self-proclamation, the only possible way to overcome the marginality.
As it was made public, the categorically opposed position to the 2016 coup was at the core of the political identity of that group, as it understood that — drawing a certain analogy with the sign of capitalist restoration — the overthrow of the PT government was not due to the action of the masses, an overcoming by the left, but rather by the right-wing opposition. This subjective element was decisive in understanding the sign of reaction and the need to “build the broadest unity of action with all sectors that were in the left-wing opposition to the government and, if possible, give this unity an organisational form: a front for struggle or a third alternative camp to the [PT] government and the right-wing opposition”10.
The manifesto that originated the ex-MAIS is very successful in expressing the mood that gave rise to that group, which brought together a significant portion of young cadres referenced in Latin American Trotskyism, restless about the need to respond to the crises of the historical period we live in, including ourselves as part of the scenario of fragmentation and marginalisation of the revolutionary Marxists. The commitment to the unity of the organisations of the combative left guided the manifesto, whether in the field of intervention in the mass movement or in the 2016 elections, with the call for a Socialist Left Front11. The essence of that manifesto, just like the launch of the movement at the Homs Club in São Paulo, looked towards the future and denied any attempt to re-enact the past:
We reject any attempt to repeat, thirty years later, the reformist experience of PT, as the majority leadership of PSOL is doing today. The reduction of the class struggle to a parliamentary struggle, the alliances with the supposedly progressive sections of the national bourgeoisie, the transformation of parliament members, senators and mayors into all-powerful figures who report to nobody but themselves – all of this has already been done. And it has failed. We will not follow this path. (Manifesto “We must snatch (joy) from the future”, my emphasis).
The global rise of neo fascism and the politics of the revolutionaries
From July 2016 to April 2018, the most reactionary elements of the political situation have deepened, with Donald Trump’s win in the US in 2017 and its influence on the rise of the new far-right worldwide having a significant impact on the global political situation. In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s political strength pointed to what would become, at the end of that year, his electoral victory and the beginning of a catastrophic experience, especially for the poorest part of the population. The manifesto approved by the NOS-MAIS12 at their merger conference is immersed in a defensive mood (“we live in times of walls and fear”). The difference with the manifesto “We must snatch (joy) from the future” that gave rise to the former MAIS was not only in terms of the name – given that the analysis of the balance of forces between classes became part of the group’s political identity, assuming a reactive character from its name: Resistance – but also in terms of tasks and profile. “Resist in the present” gained more weight, even though it included the need for “a radically anti-capitalist program”; the idea of a third camp or unity of the radical left disappeared, giving way to the broader formulation of “building united fronts of struggle”. At the same time, the need to overcome the strategy of class conciliation remained:
However, this willingness to unite in order to fight for the goals of resistance, which are central to this situation of setbacks, will not lead us to accept the desperate embrace of those who insist on class conciliation. The Brazilian working class needs a new Left, one that is not afraid to express its socialist convictions and its radical programme of breaking with the bourgeois order. (Manifesto It is time for resistance! It is necessary to transform life in order to sing it then)
Before moving on to a demonstration of how the Resistance’s positions have evolved in recent years, it is important to quickly understand how we interpret the rise of the far-right, a decisive phenomenon of our time that has developed qualitatively from 2018 to the present day. Resistencia and part of the left are wrong to treat the disease only by the symptom, ignoring the conditions that enable its development. Instead of looking at the growth of the far-right and, based on this phenomenon, explaining all the ills of the multidimensional crisis we are experiencing, we should go to the root of the problem and address its causes.
Thus, we agree with the thesis – neither new nor original – that considers that the 2007-2008 crisis, in its economic dimension, has had decisive consequences to this day. This has led to the trade conflict between the United States and China, the imperialist offensive underway in Latin America and the strategy of recolonizing countries on the periphery of capitalism, the growth of global debt, among many other effects produced by this “Great Recession”.
On the other hand, the crisis of global capitalism has a political dimension that is expressed not only in what we call the “end of the neoliberal globalisation consensus” causing divisions between the fractions of the bourgeoisie and geopolitical conflicts. Thus, there is also a crisis of bourgeois democracy, expressed in a crisis of “representation” and distrust of the masses in relation to the institutions. Gramsci’s idea of a crisis of hegemony and the “interregnum”, where terrible things can happen, has once again proven to be extremely useful for interpreting the reality.
There is also an ideological offensive by the bourgeoisie worldwide to deal with the crisis, combined with a greater reduction of the State as a maintainer of the public sector, that is, of the State as a safeguard of the private sector, combined with the financialization of the economy and the attacks to labour and social security rights. This offensive is combined with the emergence of a new subjectivity, guided by the concept of competitiveness, in which the subject understands himself as “an entrepreneur or the government of himself”. All of this is aggravated by the climate emergency, which faces denialism from both the far-right and progressive neoliberalisms, which are not very different from the (neo)extractivist policy on countries with primary economies, dependent on and exporting commodities, such as Brazil.
Without starting with the obvious observation that the working class is living in a situation of impoverishment, having gone through terrible years in the pandemic context of the return to extreme poverty, with frustrated expectations with both right-wing and “progressive” governments, it is not possible to explain the erosion of the centre ground and the far-right alternatives in the world, let alone to know how to combat them.
Recently, the comrade Henrique Canary wrote about this topic13, denying that the far right has occupied an anti-establishment space. There are two main arguments, apart from politics (which I will approach later). The first is that the far right has grown precisely among the most reactionary and conservative sectors, therefore “non-radical” sectors. The second is that there is no room for the left to be anti-establishment, since what is being discussed are defensive and minimal struggles, such as the fight against the “rapist’s bill” [Bill 1.904/2024, which sought to equate abortion with the crime of homicide]. A similar argument was used by Valério Arcary in the article “Three tactics: broad front, left unity or anti-system offensive?”14. Arcary does not argue, like Canary, that at this moment there is only room for minimal demands, but following the same reasoning, he caricatures his opponents in the field of the revolutionary left, arguing that “the most radical left (…) defends the need for an offensive tactic, that is, a maximum program”15. From there, he continues with points similar to Canary’s ones, that the balance of forces between the classes is defensive – a thing that no serious organisation questions – and that Bolsonaro threatens the democratic gains achieved in recent years, and not the capitalist system.
The far right is not, in fact, anti-establishment, but rather the bourgeoisie’s last weapon in its moments of crisis – that is part of the historical interpretation in the Trotskyist tradition16. What the leaders of the Resistance seem to forget, however, is that faced with the ruin of the petty bourgeoisie, this economically dependent and politically atomized sector is looking for a direction and, in the absence of a clear program of action on the part of the proletarian leadership, it can be deceived by the fascist fallacy17. In other words, the only antidote to fascism – and the same goes for the far-right of our time – is for the left to trust in its own strength, not be afraid to say its name and present its programme of radical transformation. Only in this way can the left avoid – what for Canary seems inevitable – the hegemony of fascism.
Canary, therefore, is wrong in equating the space for radicalism with the left’s program (as if to say “these sectors defend conservative ideas, therefore they would never be won over by the radicalism of the left”), ignoring the fact that this radicalism can very well be channelled to the far-right. For those who have doubts about the radicalism in the discourse of the far right, see Georgia Meloni criticising French colonialism in Africa18, to cite just one example. Canary seems to forget, in this article, the Transitional Program, by defending only the minimum demands under the justification of an unfavourable balance of forces to the working class.
Arcary, however, rightly argues that the socialist left should present a transitional programme, neither minimum or maximum, and be inspired by the French example led by France Insoumise and the building of the New Popular Front, which defeated the far-right and became the main political force in the last elections in France. Valerio’s contradiction is that, when it comes to drawing a parallel between the dispute between these supposed three tactics and the Brazilian situation, Valerio says he is among those who are applying a similar policy to that of France Insoumise in Brazil, neither quietist nor ultra-leftist. How wrong! Valério, Canary, Resistencia and all the groups that are currently in the majority bloc of the PSOL are, in fact, adhering to the PT’s broad front policy and, certainly against their own intentions, paving the way for an outcome à la United States and not à la France in the coming years. This opportunistic turn in the name of the United Front will be demonstrated in the sequence.
A unilateral analysis of the global political situation
The evolution of the Resistencia‘s positions, from its foundation to the present day, has been extremely contradictory. I’m not talking about the fundamental dialectical contradiction for the notion of totality from a historical materialist perspective, but rather marked by the incompatibility between divergent ideas under the same umbrella, so that the revision of its founding positions occurred not through the open denial of past positions or by a frank assessment, but by the lack of ideological cohesion perceptible to any Esquerda Online regular reader.
There are several elements of analysis that the Resistencia has crystallised over the last few years, which are being put in place to justify its current policies. The first is a unilateral and catastrophic analysis of the global political situation, which only considers the regressive characteristics and the rise of the global far-right. In this analysis, not only are the causes that lead to the rise of the far-right often omitted, but any contradictions – such as popular struggles and electoral defeats of the far-right – become difficult to explain within this framework. As a result of the rise of the global far-right, another element emerges that, for Resistencia, is crucial to understanding the current historical period: the reconstitution of the strength of the traditional leaderships of the working class. They argue that, although this is not their will, it is a fact that the reorganisation of the left has suffered with the reconstitution of the old leaderships, reducing the political space for the radical left. All of these elements, of course, are inserted within a larger scenario of political and subjective regression in the consciousness of the class after the capitalist restoration.
All these premises are part of reality: the rise of the far-right, the reconstitution of the old leaderships and the setbacks that led to the great defeat that meant the end of the old workers’ states. They are unilateral, however, because they only account for part of reality. If it is true that characteristics of the period of neoliberal triumph and the strategic crisis of revolutionary organisations in the world remain, it is also true that the period after 2007/2008 has made reality much more contradictory.
On the one hand, neofascism emerges, not as a passing phenomenon, but as a resilient and uncontested political force in Italy, France, the United States, Brazil, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Sweden, Chile, Peru… and is still growing. On the other hand, different cycles of struggles broke the previous stability, such as the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados, the Generation a Rasca, June 2013, Black Lives Matter from 2010 to 2013 and later mobilizations in Latin America such as the Chilean outbreak, mobilizations in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and the anti-racist protests that spread from the United States to Europe, Australia, South Korea and Japan between 2019 and 2020, just to name a few examples.
Likewise, at the same time that there is a recomposition of old leaderships (see the victory of the PSOE in Spain in 2019, the recomposition of the PS in Portugal, the victory of Peronism in Argentina in 2019, the return of the PSD to the German government in 2021 and the return of the MAS to the Bolivian government in 2020), there are also phenomena that point to the possibility of a reorganisation process that generates alternatives to the left of the old leaderships, even though they also have their limits, such as Boric in Chile (2021), Pedro Castillo in Peru (2021), Petro and Francia Marquez in Colombia (2022), AMLO and Sheinbaum in Mexico (2018/224). In addition to these, there were also phenomena around Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio Cortez in the 2016 and 2020 elections in the US and also Corbyn in the UK, from 2015 to 2020, and other previous experiences such as Podemos and Syriza, which rose as a distorted expression of progressive phenomena and were later defeated. Rather than characterising each of these alternatives, their limits and differences between them, what matters here is simply to note that all of these phenomena were an expression, albeit distorted, of real processes of mobilisation that drove the reorganisation of the left.
Finally, history is not linear, and drawing a mechanical thread of continuity between the 1990s and the present day causes central characteristics to be sidelined, just so that they can fit into a desired scheme. If it is true that we are still in a period of profound strategic crisis, it is also true that we are no longer living the triumph of neoliberalism, but rather its period of crisis, the symptoms of which are the division of the bourgeoisie, inter-imperialist conflicts and the hegemony crisis. This new moment, far from inevitably leading us to progressive solutions, imposes programmatic and strategic dispute as a necessity, thus opening up possibilities.
From the United Front to the Broad Front
This unilateral and catastrophic international analysis, which in fact seeks to explain the world based on the tragic Brazilian situation, is the basis for the policy of promoting the building of United Fronts, which Resistencia has elevated from a tactic to a strategy in practical terms. There are countless problems in the application of this policy, and here I will list some.
First, the United Front tactic is valid and is part of the arsenal of tactics of the Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist tradition. However, Resistencia is truly revising the United Front, which has nothing to do with Trotsky’s writings from the 1930s on the fight against Nazi-fascism. Under the justification that “reality today is completely different,” the Resistance is, in fact, distorting the UF to justify its opposite: the Broad Front.
In Resistencia’s concept of the United Front, there is no confrontation with the traitorous leaderships, there is no programmatic dispute, there is not even a common action and, under no circumstances, the possibility of an independent action within the framework of the United Front building. Therefore, the Resistencia’s United Front is an empty unity. Unity for unity on itself, regardless of the programme, action and tasks set for the class struggle at any given moment. Since the PSOL is a minority in this Front, the PSOL can only ask to be part of, under these conditions19. It is, therefore, an unconditional unity, leading to the renunciation of historical causes in the name of the United Front tactic. This was the case, for example, when Afronte, a youth movement created by Resistencia, presented at the 2022 UNE (National Students Union) Congress the resolution of political situation together with the majority camp of the UNE, which did not include demands such as the demarcation of indigenous lands, the fight against the government’s Fiscal Framework and even the demand for Bolsonaro’s imprisonment.
In the last two years, Resistencia has also put in place a relocation within the trade union and student movements, starting to form lists to run for leadership of the unions together with the government organisations, in the name of the United Front. This location did not occur during the Bolsonaro government, which could be more justifiable, since, in theory, all the left-wing opposition to the government was in the same trenches in the fight for defeating and kicking Bolsonaro Out20. Now, however, the political differences are evident and of a practical nature: these are sectors that uncritically defend the government responsible for the privatisation of national prisons, the reactionary High School Reform (NEM), among other attacks already mentioned.
The inconsistency in forming tickets with government sectors for the dispute of trade union and student entities, however, is mainly due to its justification: for Resistencia, this is not a tactical decision, imposed by specific circumstances of such categories, but rather a commitment to the application of the United Front tactic. Once again, the tactic gains a place of “privileged tactic”, which contradicts the concept itself. After all, if a certain position is not flexible and circumstantial, we are not talking about tactics but rather about principles.
The worst distortion in the concept of the United Front tactic by Resistencia, however, is when it culminates, in the end, in its actual opposite: the Broad Front tactic. After the 2022 elections, it was surprising to see many leaders arguing that the Broad Front was necessary to defeat neo-fascism in Brazil. Thus, with the appearance of a mere electoral observation (the victory of the Lula-Alckmin ticket over Bolsonaro’s candidacy), what we see is a revision of the Marxist-Leninist tradition on the constitution of Broad Fronts to combat fascism, which has not stood the test of history, not even in recent experiences.
The process that led Marta Suplicy to become Boulos’ running mate for mayor of São Paulo was no different21. Obviously, in the elections that are taking place now, all democratic players must vote and actively campaign for Boulos/Marta’s election, just as we elected Lula/Alckmin, and no effort should be spared to defeat Nunes and Pablo Marçal in the country’s largest and most important capital. This political struggle should not give us the right, precisely because of our commitment to the working class, to normalise the “forgetting” of Marta as one of the greatest defenders of the 2016 coup, transforming her into the great reference for the peripheral population, feeding the illusion in the legacy of a Marta that no longer exists.
To leave no doubt about the political defence that the Resistance has made of broad electoral fronts, Valério Arcary recently published a text about the São Paulo elections, in which he states:
But it would be a serious mistake not to understand that it is not possible to win with the left’s votes alone. And there would be no time to “turn the corner” in two weeks of the runoff. Boulos has already repositioned his image to reduce his rejection. It is very strong because Boulos has had a history of being a popular fighter for twenty years. If Boulos had presented himself as the face of the 2020 elections, the MTST organiser, the election would have been lost. It is not just because he is the candidate of a coalition, although that is important. Agreements must be respected. Without Lula’s support, it is impossible to win22
In other words, for Valerio, the political and programmatic inflections of the Boulos campaign – which, evidently, include the alliance with Marta, who was part of the MDB until very recently, the downgrading of the programme and the attempt to dissociate Boulos’ image as a leader of a social movement – are a necessity for victory. Thus, he contradicts himself when he uses, in the article already cited, the condition for victory of the left in the French elections. Of course, it will not be possible to win and elect Boulos as mayor with only the votes of the left. However, we should bet that it is possible to win with the left’s programme, as happened with the election of the New Popular Front (NFP) in France. “Winning” without regarding the programme should not be an option for those who call themselves revolutionary.
In fact, the worrying rise in the polls of Pablo Marçal23, until now considered merely an eccentric figure with no real chance in the elections, demonstrates how a true criminal was able to rise while being identified as a radical far-right candidate24, disrespecting all electoral laws and positioning himself as an “outsider”. Faced with the tragic possibility of having São Paulo governed by someone like Marçal, the worst possible strategy is to avoid confrontation, believe in a supposed dehydration or depoliticize the campaign precisely when electoral polarisation increases.
What is repeated, as in the Biden-Kamala Harris government in the United States, is evidence that the programmatic downgrade — an imposition by the formation of multi-class fronts — fuels frustration, due to the inability of a programme for the big elites to meet the needs of workers, young people and, mainly, the most oppressed groups, in the face of the multidimensional crisis in which we live.
From the moment that the new progressivism begins to be, like the old reformists in times of crisis, identified with the establishment, the fertile ground is created for the growth of fascist ideas with their “anti-establishment” propaganda25.
Capitulation to Lula-PTism in the name of “not isolating ourselves from the masses”
The policies applied by Resistencia in relation to Lula-PTism have changed in quality over the last two years, since the elections that led to the third Lula government. Until then, the organisation defended the need to build the Left Front tactic in the struggle and in the elections, without alliances with the right, demanding that Lula’s candidacy nominate a vice president from the social movements. This tactic, regardless of the tactical debates about the elections at that time, was valid and remained within the framework of the strategy to remove Bolsonaro from the presidency, defending a left-wing programme.
The situation changes in quality when the Broad Front is confirmed, with characteristic elements of national unity, which led to the composition of Lula with Alckmin, who needs no further characterization. At that time, it was clear that voting for Lula was necessary to defeat Bolsonaro electorally, but that the prospect would be a repeat of the class conciliation governments that led to the rise of the far-right in the country. Given the government’s statements that it was “necessary to change the spending cap to a new reference accepted in Faria Lima (the banking HQ offices, in São Paulo)”26, the class character of the government was crystal clear and what was likely to happen in the following years, especially given the economic crisis the world and the country are experiencing. The uncritical support for the 2022 campaign by the Resistencia and its parliamentarians is part of a revisionist scheme that has serious consequences for the current organisation’s politics.
The comrades of the Resistance could argue, of course, that these were the most important elections of our generation. However, now, in 2024, we are no longer under the Bolsonaro government. We saw the government implementing the Fiscal Framework, a measure comparable only to the Temer government’s Spending Cap; we went through a very important strike at Federal Universities and Institutes, confronting the government’s hard line; alongside the app-based companies that overexploit the workforce, the government presented Bill 1204, which represents a setback for platform workers and for the rights currently supported by the CLT (Brazilian labour legislation), such as the minimum wage. The week this article was written, a cut of more than R$5.5 billion (nearly $1Bi USD) in health and education was announced, reinforcing the government’s commitment to fiscal austerity.
In light of this, what has Resistencia been doing? They were correct to be against the Fiscal Framework27, but supported the Tax Reform28, criticising the PSOL member of parliament who did not vote in favour of the Bill. There are countless combative comrades who are in Resistencia and took part in the Federal Institutes strike, but the organisation did not sign the manifesto against the “Uber Bill”, after almost a month without making a public statement about the bill that was being processed in a very accelerated pace (urgency regime). On social media, members of parliament take photos with Haddad, the minister of the Fiscal Framework, and on May 1st, the traditional day of workers’ struggle, there were Resistencia with its members of parliament, taking photos with the President on the stage, where it was explicitly forbidden to express any solidarity with the Federal Institutes strike.
Reorganisation towards right versus grassroots reorganisation
Since its creation, PSOL has always had a bloc that advocates the Popular Democratic Programme, seeking to recreate the PT experience. This is part of the characteristics of the party, which, also since its inception, has proposed to be a front, along the lines of broad left parties. Resistencia joined PSOL in a context in which this reformist bloc was already part of its leadership and, as already mentioned, we said: “we are not following this path”. Well, it doesn’t take much to see that it was Resistencia who changed its position, and not the majority leadership of PSOL. Nor has reality changed to the point that they’re imposing “the repetition of the PT’s reformist experience” as a necessity.
Resistencia’s analysis to justify its policy in the area of reorganisation is that with the deepening of the unfavourable balance of forces to the working class, a phenomenon of PT’s reconstitution has occurred. Thus, some leaders came to the conclusion that the “space on the left” in the reorganisation is already closed. Therefore, whatever reorganisation there is today will be to the right of the PSOL. With this analysis, they conclude that the development of the reorganisation will take place primarily on the PT ranks and that is where “The Boulos Strategy”29 come in. This Arcary’s article is exemplary of the Resistencia’s vision of the process of reorganisation of the Brazilian left.
This article contains the ideas of: a) the hegemony of Lulaism and the Workers’ Party, as an “overwhelming” force; b) the resilience of Lulaism associated with the experience interrupted by the 2016 coup; and, curiously, that c) “support for Lula has a programmatic dimension, but voting for revolutionaries for the presidency of a union or for parliamentary positions is personal.” and, finally, that d) Boulos is an exception, because he surpassed the PT in SP, which is where his strategic character resides.
In other words, for Valério Arcary and Resistencia, the policy currently implemented by them and their location within PSOL are justified by the fact that PT has a hegemony over the working class that can only be overcome “when all expectations of negotiated solutions have been exhausted”30 by the workers. Thus, he attributes the reason for its capitulation to Lulaism and the Workers’ Party to the subjectivity of the working class. As if we could not dispute this conscience, they conclude that our programme can only be disputed when the reformist illusions are completely dispelled.
The idea that the vote for Lula was programmatic is completely false. In the days before the 2022 elections, the whole mainstream press reported on the lack of a programme for Lula’s candidacy31, the lack of definitions on the economy32 and the absence of a government plan even after the first round of the elections33. This was the way PT managed to build a very broad front, from PSOL to Geraldo Alckmin. Evidently, if the Fiscal Framework had been presented during the electoral campaign, for example, it could have generated a crisis with the electorate on the left, as well as any programmatic signalling in the opposite direction, such as, hypothetically, the defence of the abortion legalisation, would displease the electorate on the right and its corresponding superstructure. For this reason, the demand presented by Resistencia that “Lula, deliver the programme approved by the polls” makes no sense at all. We all know that the vote for Lula was a vote to remove Bolsonaro. Not a single programme line moved voters, other than the immediate and urgent need to remove Bolsonaro from power, as we correctly did.
Now, to conclude this analysis, it comes to attention how Valério Arcary detours in his analysis-justification. For him, not only the voting for Lula is programmatic, but voting for revolutionaries in PSOL is “personal”. In other words, according to him, when they vote for a congresswoman like Sâmia Bomfim, it has nothing to do with the struggles waged in defence of legal abortion, against spending cuts in public services, the defence of the MST against Bolsonaro supporters and others. Of course, for Valério, voting for Sâmia is “personal”, after all, if it were not, how could he justify the space for radical ideas in such an adverse context and with such hegemony of Lula-PTism in the left-wing space?
I believe in a completely different view of the reorganisation process. I understand that the reorganisation of the Brazilian left, that is, its transformation process with a view to overcoming (by the left) the tools forged in the workers’ uprising of the 1980s — now assimilated by the structure of the State — is an ongoing process. The reorganisation of the left in Brazil may be smaller or slower than we would like, but it exists, and it is expressed in the mobilisation processes that went beyond the PT hegemony. June 2013, Secondary school occupations in 2016, the general strike in 2017, the education tsunami in 2019, the anti-racist uprising and the APPs’ Break in 2020, the annual Terra Livre encampment that in 2021 brought together more than 7,000 indigenous people from all over the country; the transmasculine march this year, in addition to countless strikes, territorial and daily struggles that have been led by young people, precarious workers, black people and women.
Recovering the ability to imagine and build an ecosocialist world
Looking back, with the help of time, it is clear today to understand how Resistencia has openly abandoned the central points of its founding constitution. The same people who said they would never be with the majority leadership of PSOL, which sought to recreate the PT experience, not only changed sides but became the greatest defenders of this political bloc, at a time when the political independence of PSOL has never been so threatened.
This sharp turn is justified in the name of fighting the far-right, but actually, the dependence that this organisation has established on its allies in the PTL [the bloc of the majority of PSOL leadership] prevents them from being consistent with that task, which is strategic and decisive for the future of the working class, in the name of maintaining diplomatic relations with groups that are currently driven by pragmatic interests in occupying positions in the institutional establishment.
Still, that question remains unanswered: how does the Brazilian left die? First, the left fails to fulfil its historical role when it becomes part of the establishment of a regime in crisis and without social support. Up to this point, however, we are not talking about anything new when we deal with traditional reformism. What is devastating and symptomatic of the strategic crisis we are going through, however, is when revolutionary organisations give up on arguing for their program in reality — which includes using all the necessary tactical flexibility — in favour of the failed expectation of a hypothetical return to the past.
Starting from the idea of the death of the left does not mean, in this article, in any way denying the historical need to fight for a radical program linked to revolutionary practice. On the contrary, recognizing the crisis is just the first step towards overcoming it. Nor is it about denying the existence of a selfless militancy that today works within social movements and political organisations of different shades, from Leninists to autonomists, across the most varied generations.
On the other hand, it is true that if we find ourselves in a scenario of enormous distrust towards political organisations, this is due, among other factors, to the fact that most organisations publicly recognized as “left” have practically merged with the regime and its institutions, contenting themselves with managing the crisis and being incapable of vocalising the real demands of a society that is in urgent need of solutions, with the dissenting forces being a minority in the establishment of a counter-hegemonic project, what the current situation demands.
It also involves an inability, as Lenin said, of revolutionaries to be so connected to the masses that they can merge with them. Today we are living in a situation of enormous distance between most left-wing political organisations and the urgent needs of workers and, at the same time, from an entire layer of activists who work on their fronts without finding a counterpart for these struggles in any superstructure.
Attempts in this sense are often more about form than content, as seen in the gross instrumentalization of demands related to recognition/identity for electoral purposes; the green scarves unaccompanied by courage to guide society on the need to legalize abortion; the lack of demands for the rupture of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Zionist state of Israel; and the low engagement of militants in the demonstrations against the genocide in Gaza, by groups that supposedly defend the Palestinian cause.
The far-right is a real political force in our country and in the world. It feeds on the fascist movement that has existed since 1930 and gains strength by occupying the space of traditional right-wing parties. It is a counterrevolutionary program, with no commitment to the regime’s institutions and unafraid to openly advocate its programme that combines the most reactionary aspects of democracy with the deepening of a neo-extractivist and neoliberal economy. Facing the need to defend a radical program of rupture from the left is to be consistent with this diagnosis. Those who believe that only through electoral performance will we defeat the strategy that aims at our own destruction underestimate the far-right.
Our generation has never been so demanded, in a practical and urgent sense, to overcome the capitalist mode of production and its destructive forces on humanity and nature. The crisis of programme and practice of left-wing parties must give way to truly counter-hegemonic projects34 that reclaim the revolutionary horizon, confidence in popular sovereignty, and pursue an ecosocialist strategy, seeking to renew the notion of party inspired by the movements of our time (being a party-movement in its multiple senses). Abandoning self-proclamation is as necessary as accepting the death of the left, because — as good Marxists, we are materialists — if a new revolutionary project can emerge and present a horizon for the future to those below, it will come not only from the strength of our ideas, but from the experiences, social movements, and existing revolutionary organisations.
1 https://brasil.elpais.com/opiniao/2020-02-10/como-a-esquerda-brasileira-morreu.html and https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrissima/2024/02/esquerda-morreu-e-extrema-direita-e-unica-forca-real-no-pais-diz-safatle.shtml
2 As an example, an article published by Valério Arcary in https://outraspalavras.net/crise-brasileira/a-esquerda-brasileira-morreu/
3 Regarding the importance of open discussions, see Lenin regarding “Polemics” on “Letter to Apollinaria Yakubova” in https://archive.org/stream/LeninCW/Lenin%20CW-Vol.%2043_djvu.txt
4 The original manifesto “É preciso arrancar alegria ao futuro”, in portuguese https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2016/07/10/e-preciso-arrancar-alegria-ao-futuro/
5 My political experience came from the trajectory that gave rise to MAIS and I did not have a shared experience of activism with the former NOS before the merger, thus I will not develop a more precise characterization of this group or even its origins in the text. I believe it is worth noting, however, that NOS was a combative group, already placed within PSOL, and part of its cadre was among those who participated in the party since its creation. Before the merger that gave rise to Resistência, NOS was placed within PSOL in the building of a third political camp in the party, being part of the opposition to the party’s majority leadership. In the social movement, NOS encouraged the building of a Left Front, which had repercussions on the vanguard, especially in Rio de Janeiro.
6 Idem 4
7 Idem
8 Idem
9 Idem
10 Idem
11 “We defend the unity of this third camp also in the 2016 local elections. We propose to the PSTU, the PSOL, the PCB, the political organisations that do not have legal status and the social movements the creation of a Left and Socialist Front, with a programme of rupture with the austerity plans that are being implemented by all governments and city halls. We place ourselves at the service of these great tasks from now on.” — manifesto “We must snatch (joy) from the future”
12 In English – https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2018/05/11/it-is-time-for-resistance/
13 In Portuguese – https://esquerdaonline.com.br/?s=antissistema
14 In Portuguese – https://operamundi.uol.com.br/opiniao/tres-taticas-frente-ampla-unidade-de-esquerda-ou-ofensiva-antissistema/
15 Idem
16 Trotsky, The Only Road (Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie, and Proletariat) – https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1932/onlyroad1.htm#s2
17 The despairing petty bourgeois sees in Fascism, above all, a fighting force against big capital, and believes that, unlike the working-class parties which deal only in words, Fascism will use force to establish more “justice” (…) Fascism unites and arms the scattered masses. Out of human dust it organises combat detachments. It thus gives the petty bourgeoisie the illusion of being an independent force. It begins to imagine that it will really command the state. It is not surprising that these illusions and hopes turn the head of the petty bourgeoisie! But the petty bourgeoisie can also find a leader in the proletariat. This was demonstrated in Russia and partially in Spain. In Italy, in Germany and in Austria the petty bourgeoisie gravitated in this direction. But the parties of the proletariat did not rise to their historic task.
To bring the petty bourgeoisie to its side, the proletariat must win its confidence. And for that it must have confidence in its own strength. It must have a clear program of action and must be ready to struggle for power by all possible means.
Trotsky, Whither France? – https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/whitherfrance/ch00.htm
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXo6AahhrQ8
19 In order to avoid making the text too long and boring, I will not go into quotes about the United Front, but reading the Theses on the United Front, approved at the IV Congress of the IC, is essential for anyone who wants to delve deeper into the subject. Just one reading is enough to identify that the tactics of the United Front have nothing to do with the “unity” that is so often promoted in the PSOL to justify a line of uncritical adherence to PT. Available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/ffyci-2/08.htm
20 In this article, I will not go deeper into the merits of the majority leadership’s unwillingness to wage a consistent fight to oust Bolsonaro, for electoral purposes.
21 In a recent article published in Esquerda Online, the practice of calling “Left Front” compositions that are in fact broad fronts is repeated, which contributes to confusing the vanguard and disarming the militants about what tasks this type of alliance demands of revolutionaries. See here, in Portuguese: https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2024/08/16/eleicoes-2024-derrotar-a-extrema-direita-com-a-frente-de-esquerda/
22 In Portuguese – https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2024/08/21/eleicao-em-sao-paulo/
23 In Portuguese – https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2024/08/marcal-cresce-de-14-para-21-e-empata-com-boulos-23-e-nunes-19-na-disputa-pela-prefeitura-de-sao-paulo.shtml
24 In Portuguese – https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/pulso/post/2024/08/pablo-marcal-quatro-pontos-explicam-o-crescimento-do-candidato-do-prtb-na-pesquisa-datafolha-entenda.ghtml
25 About this topic, see Marcos Nobre (in Portuguese): https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-que-vem-depois-do-neoliberalismo/
26 In Portuguese https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2022/01/brasil-precisa-trocar-teto-de-gastos-por-regra-fiscal-crivel-di z-nelson-barbosa.shtml?utm_source=sharenativo&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=sharenativo
27 In Portuguese – https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2023/05/29/por-que-nao-apoiamos-o-arcabouco-fiscal/
28 In English – https://esquerdaonline.com.br/2023/07/09/tax-reform-advances-and-limits/
29 In Portuguese – https://www.esquerda.net/opiniao/estrategia-boulos/88679
30 Idem
31 In Portuguese – https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-63098307
32 In Portuguese – https://valor.globo.com/politica/eleicoes-2022/noticia/2022/09/30/lula-faz-aposta-em-frente-ampla-sem-definicoes-economicas.ghtml
33 In Portuguese – https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/09/campanha-de-lula-confirma-que-nao-tera-texto-final-do-plano-de-governo-no-1o-turno.shtml
34 About strategic imagination, see the excellent article from Josep Maria Antentas (in Portuguese): https://intercoll.net/Imaginacao-estrategica-e-partido-a-luta-lei-da-vida
