It is time to plow the field of a mass defeatist movement. A contribution by Luca Scacchi, CGIL General Assembly.
On March 15, 2015, La Repubblica (one of Italy’s main progressive newspapers) and Michele Serra (a writer and columnist, who in the 1980s was also the editor of L’Unità’s satirical supplement, the newspaper of the Italian Communist Party) called for a demonstration “for Europe.” The event gathered mayors, parties, and social organizations from the Left, ultimately attracting 30,000 actual participants. The decision to support or join this initiative deeply divided the progressive and leftist world, sparking debate among the country’s broad political and social vanguard (an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 activists from parties, unions, and associations), generating unexpected involvement and a strong emotional impact. The simultaneous launch of the ReArmEU plan gave the demonstration much sharper tones and meanings than originally intended, though these were not entirely foreign to its premise. A neo-nationalist undertone became evident in the demonstration, not only in the speeches favoring von der Leyen’s plan by well-known “moderate” figures out and within the Democratic Party (such as Calenda, leader of the liberal party Azione, and the democratic MEP Picerno, who had just voted for it in the European Parliament) but also in the unexpected interventions of prominent left-wing intellectuals. For instance, Antonio Scurati, author of a recent biographical novel on Mussolini, declared: “We are not a People who raze cities to the ground. We do not massacre civilians, deport children, and use them as ransom. We did so when Italians—too many, though not all—were fascists and allied with the Nazis. And precisely because of that, we have stopped doing it forever. We do not deport migrants in chains for the cameras. We do not cut public funds to humanitarian organizations, we do not deny climate change. We do not publicly humiliate the leader of a country that has been fighting for survival for three years.” Similarly, singer Roberto Vecchioni, long an advocate for social and civil rights, proclaimed: “We have democracy. Not everyone has it; we do. And it is a Greek invention. […] I tell you Socrates, I tell you Spinoza, I tell you Descartes, I tell you Hegel, Marx, and I also tell you Shakespeare, Cervantes, Pirandello, Manzoni, Leopardi… Do others have these things?”. Some major social organizations, such as the CGIL (Italy’s largest trade union), ANPI (National Association of Italian Partisans), and ARCI (a leftist cultural and recreational association), engaged in internal discussions for an entire week. When CGIL and ANPI ultimately decided to “participate without endorsing” the rally—bringing peace flags instead of European ones—thousands of reactions and comments, many of them critical, poured in. The 5-star movement, on the other hand, chose not to be in the square and call its own demonstration in early April. Meanwhile, ARCI Rome, alongside social movements, trade unions (including the alternative congress current within CGIL), and left-wing parties (PRC, PCI, Potere al Popolo, etc.), organized an alternative, simultaneous demonstration against war and ReArmEU. This event, which also included Stalinist and “campist” factions, drew 4,000 to 5,000 participants. Many comrades and activists chose instead to take part in neither rally.
Luca Scacchi, a leading figure in CGIL’s alternative current and a member of ControVento, wrote this article to explain his decision to join the alternative square.
In these days of intense discussion, some have argued that the demonstration promoted by Michele Serra and La Repubblica is outdated and ultimately non-essential. “We are dividing over nothing,” they say. “We will not let The man on the hammock (the title of Serra’s weekly column) dictate our positions; “the proposal for a rally on Europe is mistimed and fails to grasp the latest developments of von der Leyen’s plan”; “after the 15th, other issues will be more relevant”; “in the end, it will be just another demonstration like many others and will leave no trace.”
I do not think that this is the case. By calling for this demonstration in Piazza del Popolo, Michele Serra and La Repubblica are trying to build collective representations and shape consciousness. After all, that is their job, and ultimately, one of the main functions of a mass demonstration is precisely this: to craft imaginaries, plant a flag in people’s minds, and spark their participation to defend that flag thus developing a political project, also by identifying an adversary against whom to close ranks.
The demonstration for Europe aims to place the revival of a federalist process at the center of the left’s political agenda, in order to compete more effectively with other global powers. Michele Serra made this clear in his initial article-appeal: “What will become of Europe, which today appears to be the classic earthenware pot between two iron pots, both filled with nuclear bombs? Will the European way of life survive this pressure, which challenges what we commonly call democracy—that is, the separation of powers, equal rights and duties for all, religious freedom and secularism of the state, equal dignity and tranquility for both those in government and the opposition? And if autocracies speak simply and clearly (and lie at will, thanks to the constant technological falsification of reality), what language must Europe adopt so that its voice is not only audible but also strong, convincing, and as seductive as that of its enemies?” He reiterated this point in a later clarification (Europe, What We Defend by Defending Ourselves): “There is a void to be filled, a political and ethical structure that remains very fragile, in a historical phase where anxiety and uncertainty are widespread sentiments. European defense is, of course, a technical-military issue (EU member states already spend 200 billion euros a year collectively, as much as China and far more than Russia), but above all, it is a political issue. The key question is: what are we defending when we defend ourselves? The answer is crucial. We are defending rights, multilingualism, religious freedom, inclusion, the separation of powers, and, not least—and perhaps first and foremost at this moment—we are defending the welfare state.” For those who still did not understand, he reaffirmed it in a later article (Europeans in Search of Europe): “I asked myself whether, caught between Putin and Trump, it was time to take to the streets to demand that Europe exist not only as a bureaucratic-economic entity but also as an ethical-political subject, by accelerating its long (too long) journey toward federation and transnational unity… In the intense debate of these days, some have said: ‘Peace first.’ Others have said: ‘Freedom first.’ But ‘Europe’—at least in the realm of principles—means that these two things must necessarily go together, because one cannot exist without the other [in other words, not ‘peace first,’ not ‘freedom first,’ but ‘Europe first!’]… After all, the need for a common European defense should have been planned and implemented ten (twenty? thirty?) years ago, but it is today that forces us to confront this issue […] So, in conclusion, we asked: come with the European flag. No party symbols, please. A blue square with yellow stars that asks, and asks itself: We are here—where is the Europe we want?”
This demonstration, in essence, asserts the need for a unified and independent European space. In the dark times of Trumpism and the possibility of a Russian political victory (having withstood NATO’s economic and military pressure on the Ukrainian front despite the disastrous first months of the invasion), amidst the onset of new trade wars between major capitalist poles (primarily the U.S., China, and, indeed, Europe), the March 15 rally prioritizes the revival of a political European Union capable of protecting its democratic and social model. This is ultimately the same aspiration expressed by Enrico Letta (Much More Than a Market, April 2024), Mario Draghi (Report on the Future of European Competitiveness, September 2024), and Romano Prodi (Two-Speed Europe: Now or Never, June 2024). Their proposals, of course, are more structured than those of a columnist, given their roles as former prime ministers and leading figures within the EU (a former MEP, a former ECB president, and a former European Commission president, respectively). Michele Serra evokes the poetry of founding values; they articulate the prose of an economic and political plan. But at its core, it is the same vision: Serra explicitly references it in his call for a do something (a famous Draghi’s expression in the presentation of his Plan). In the works of Letta and Draghi, as well as in Prodi’s reversal of his historical opposition to EuroKern (a highly integrated core of countries, which he opposed in the 1990s but now sees as the only viable path forward), there is more than just a call for new structural funds and Eurobonds, though these are included. More crucially, they advocate for giving the EU a truly shared economic structure. The first step, then, is the unification of capital and the creation of continental champions in key industries (AI, ICT, defense, energy), to sustain competition with other global powers. The core of this new federal union is also at the heart of the March 15 demonstration. Romano Prodi, writing in prose, explains what Serra poetically outlines in What We Defend by Defending Ourselves: “A common army is the means to ensure our security with limited expenditures while safeguarding our acquired rights and democratic achievements. We must begin with what can be done today, then move immediately toward a unified command. European rearmament is, therefore, a necessary first step.”
This proposal forced the entire Left to take a stance within just a few days, opening fault lines, sparking debates, and causing divisions within major political forces. This, in itself, is already an achievement: it demonstrates the ability of this intellectual and his newspaper to identify a political issue still lurking beneath the surface of social awareness, bring it to light, and make it a shared concern, compelling individuals and groups to take a position. Demonstrations that gain strength and social significance are those that carve out a dividing line, a field where people can recognize themselves. The one proposed by Michele Serra and Repubblica is against the reactionary Right and aims to redefine the progressive camp. This is its strength.
This is a demonstration against the reactionary Right. The growing global competition, reignited by the Great Crisis that began in 2006–09 and the way it was managed, has been accompanied over the last decade by revanchist rhetoric, resurgent misogyny, new authoritarianisms, and dreams of a new world order. These have been fueled by the political and social resurgence of middle classes threatened by the crisis and nostalgic for a past they never lived. We saw it coming: Modi, Erdogan, Netanyahu, Shinzo Abe in Japan, Duterte in the Philippines, the authoritarian nationalism of Xi Jinping, Putin, Orban, the Kaczyński brothers in Poland, Bolsonaro in Brasil, Piñera in Chile, Trump’s first presidency, Salvini, and the yellow-green government in Italy in 2018. We have also seen its resurgence with the invasion of Ukraine and the beginning of a new era of imperialist friction: Meloni in Italy, Milei in Argentina, Bukele in El Salvador, Trump’s second presidency, Netanyahu’s genocidal policies, the rise of Le Pen and Bardella’s National Rally, the AfD and Merz in Germany, and the para-fascist right in Scandinavian and Iberian countries. Today, this reactionary right is shaping world politics through the revival of trade wars, U.S. expansionist threats toward Canada and Greenland, ethnic cleansing scenarios in Gaza, and a geopolitical shift of the US towards Russia aimed at pulling it away from China’s influence. In this shifting phase, Michele Serra and Repubblica identify a fundamental contradiction in the European reactionary Right (unlike its US or Asian counterparts): its retreat into narrow national interests. This reactionary Right has built mass support from middle classes hit by the economic crisis, austerity policies, and the increasing competition and centralization of capital, all of which have been embodied in EU policies over the years. New and old professionals, shopkeepers, small industrialists, public officials, and middle managers have been squeezed by the euro’s unequal exchange rate, EU trade regulations (designed to impose European standards and products globally but also burdening small national capital), and financialization. As a result, the reactionary Right has grown from marginalized neighborhoods and regions, drawing in popular and working-class sectors. However, economic, political, and military competition now operates at a continental level. Integrating this cluster of representations and sentiments into the vision of a powerful Europe is not only difficult in the short term but also risks fracturing the reactionary Right itself. We see this daily in Meloni’s hesitations, the conflicts between Salvini and Tajani (leader of Lega e Forza Italia, the partner in the government coalition), and Vannacci’s attempts to distance himself (a former paratrooper general, an MEP for the Lega on far-right nationalist positions, with temptations to form his own party outside and against the government). At present, the European reactionary right is not an instrument for building a powerful Europe. The day it succeeds in doing so —perhaps by framing it around white, Christian, and traditional supremacy— the political landscape of the continent could shift dramatically. For now, however, these forces are merely supporting a loose intergovernmental coordination (a von der Leyen-style military buildup and disjointed economic policies), which, as Serra warns, risks being shattered like a clay pot between the iron pots of China and the U.S.
A Governing Left for Europe. Faced with the Right’s inability to take on the role of building a federal Union, Michele Serra and Repubblica propose this perspective as the defining project for the progressive camp. After all, back in the 1990s, when the continent’s conservative Right was too closely tied to national capital, the interests of local bourgeoisies, and entrenched national hierarchies within the framework of the EEC, the reformist Left took it upon itself to personally lead the neoliberal and austerity policies that shaped the European Union and the euro (Delors and the French Socialist Party, Prodi and the Union, Schröder and the SPD). The political dynamic of the 1990s and early 2000s was thus long marked by the presence of two right-wing forces (this was the title of a famous book, much discussed in the Left): one conservative and one progressive, both of which pursued policies that squeezed overall wage (direct, indirect, and social). This process facilitated, on the one hand, the erosion of social participation and, on the other, the shift of large sections of the population toward the reactionary Right (in Italy after the 2009/2012 double recession, through an initial transition via the Five Star Movement and then into the Conte-Salvini government). Now, Michele Serra and Repubblica suggest that progressive forces can once again take on the role of shaping European policy: today, not so much centered on the euro and austerity but rather on global competition and, consequently, rearmament. Of course, this is framed within a “peace-oriented perspective,” as it aims to defend democratic values, integration, and the welfare state. However, the true priority is the construction of a continental power bloc: a sort of re-edition of the “two-step” policy that we already saw in the 1990s, when today’s social dialogue was supposed to lead to tomorrow’s employment (in reality, we only witnessed wage compression and precarious work!). Michele Serra and Repubblica thus attempt to address today’s anxieties, exploit a weakness of the Right, and delineate a political space for a primarily pro-European progressive camp. This demonstration, therefore, does not end on March 15. Its objective is to launch the founding process of a new political perspective, to reopen discussion on the programmatic direction of progressive forces, and to reorganize it around the European priority. In essence, on that square and within that demonstration, yet another permanent congress of the Democratic Party will be announced, to define its boundaries, its identity, and its project (an alliance against the right, a broad coalition, or a pro-European stance). Looming over this discussion are figures such as Paolo Gentiloni, the reconstruction of a political bloc with Renzi and Calenda (the leaders of two little liberal parties, now in a sort of a center and moderate space in the middle of the political camp), the opening of a dialogue with Forza Italia and its more centrist faction, the sidelining of Schlein’s leadership, and the downgrading of the Five Star Movement. In the end, the true political chameleon Giuseppe Conte (leader of this movement, who has played a leading role in the yellow-green government, the yellow-red government, support for Draghi, the broad coalition strategy, and finally, independent progressivism within The Left in Europe) could still carve out a role in this new Europeanist framework, as long as it remains subordinate to the emerging structure. March 15 will not be the end, because this dynamic is intertwined with other political trajectories and ambitions: the rise of Ernesto Maria Ruffini and Catholic networks (an exponent of civil society, whose new political commitment is announced), Franceschini’s moves to bypass the logic of coalition politics and the construction of an alternative government to Meloni and Salvini (Dario Franceschini is a leading Catholic in the PD, at the head of one of its main currents and behind all the line and secretary changes in its history).
The CGIL has been caught off guard by this demonstration and its political strength. In recent years, I have sharply criticized the leadership of the CGIL —first under Camusso and then under Landini— for the inconclusiveness of its actions and vision. This inconclusiveness has been evident in mobilizations that were often mistimed, initiated but never pursued with determination. Examples include: opposition to the Marchionne model, which stalled in 2012 except in courtrooms; the initiative against the Jobs Act, limited to the general strike of December 2014 and abandoned without further action for over a decade; the Charter of Rights and the 2016 referendums on education (the first forgotten, the latter unsupported); the March strikes during the pandemic, contained to prevent fear from turning into anger (this was a famous statement by Landini himself); and the strikes against Draghi’s government and, later, the first steps of Meloni’s administration, which were fragmented and sporadic. However, this inconclusiveness was also evident in concertazione, the CGIL’s conciliatory approach to crisis management. In an era of international competition, pressure on profit margins, and the disruption of capital accumulation mechanisms —in short, during a period of Great Crisis— neither the government nor business leaders are willing to accept any lasting compromise. Over the past fifteen years, the contractual system has been disarticulated (with increasing discrepancies between working conditions and sectoral regulatory systems), and universal social wage systems have been eroded (pensions, healthcare, public transport, and education). Over the past year, the course of events—the actions of the Meloni government, the new wave of reactionary politics worldwide, and growing international tensions—has triggered a shift in the CGIL. The necessity of conflict has been acknowledged as essential to keeping the interests of labor alive [never before as explicitly cited, for instance, at the recent Assembly of Assemblies in Bologna, from Alessandro Barbero’s introduction – a popular historian – to the speeches of key union leaders]. Conflict has even become a rallying cry, with repeated calls for social revolt (we need a social uprising, this was a controversial statement by Landini in an interview, which has become an oft-repeated slogan in the union in recent months, underlying even the recent referendum campaign: the attempt, that is, to repeal some neoliberal laws on layoffs, contracting out, and precarious work).
The problem today, then, is no longer inconclusiveness, but risks becoming inconsistency. The CGIL has recognized the need to organize social conflict, yet it has incongruously channeled it primarily into the electoral arena: the vote is our revolt (this is the claim for the referendum campaign). It once again made the December general strike with UIL a one-off event, left individual sectors to handle their own separate contract disputes (such as the strikes in the metalworking and education sectors, the separate renewal in the central administration, and the confrontation with the CISL and autonomous unions in the upcoming RSU elections for the public sector), while focusing its overall initiative on the referendum campaign. The CGIL leadership has thus placed a bet: to make the spring referendums a defining moment, centered on differentiated autonomy, labor-related questions, and citizenship. The driving force of the referendum was the request to repeal social federalism, against the dismantling of universal rights and services: last year, in fact, this issue unexpectedly opened the possibility of seizing the media agenda and even upending the current political balance, eroding Right-wing support and calling the stability of the government itself into question. The significant number of signatures collected in just a few weeks, the initiative’s popularity in the southern regions, and the attention it garnered even in the north made reaching the quorum attainable and brought the issue to the forefront. Meanwhile, the other referendum questions—on job insecurity, dismissals, and citizenship—gave the campaign a strong social dimension that would have influenced the vote regardless. The idea was to forge an opposition based on labor rights and the defense of the welfare state, ensuring that, no matter how the electoral battle ended, it would still sustain a mass movement dynamic.
This scenario was effectively dismantled in two moves. First, the Constitutional Court rejected the referendum question on differentiated autonomy. This largely unexpected outcome suddenly broke the spearhead of the referendum initiative—not only making it unlikely to reach the quorum (and thus its ability to capture social attention) but also limiting the impact of the vote itself, which no longer challenges the government’s structure and future direction. Some authoritative analyses trace the reasons for this unexpected ruling to concerns within Quirinal (the presidential Palace) and Catholic-democratic circles. On one hand, they were worried about Trump’s rise and Italy’s institutional stability (the priority being to prevent a national split and a government crisis amid a probable—and eventually real—European turmoil). On the other hand, they were drawn to the idea of obstructing a progressive realignment around labor issues. The second decisive moment was precisely March 15: the proposal to reconstruct a progressive political camp under the yellow-blue banner of a federal Europe. The attempt by CGIL, ANPI, AVS (the Italian reformist Green-Left Alliance, around 6% of the votes) to paint that square in rainbow colors (to subvert the yellow-blue framework from below) will prove inconsistent, I fear. First, regardless of the symbolic colors of that gathering, what is emerging is a project that cuts effortlessly through the divisions and uncertainties of the broad progressive front and the reformist Left. A foundation based on social and labor issues cannot simply rest on a referendum campaign. Here, the weight of the absence of a real mass movement, the fragmentation, and the intermittent nature of social conflict is immense. Furthermore, the presence of CISL and UIL (the other two main Union in Italy) under the yellow-blue banner of that gathering provides a crucial point of leverage to socially contain any rainbow dynamics. In fact, the inability of key actors from the social and pacifist front to disengage from this dynamic only serves to reinforce its framework and its gravitational pull. Second, to overturn the political dynamics of a public demonstration, one must have clarity and determination about the alternative path to be pursued. This is not the case for the CGIL.
The prospect of a federal European revival marked by its rearmament is indeed disorienting for the CGIL. The history, tradition, culture, and underlying social values of the CGIL place it firmly in the pacifist and anti-militarist camp. Unlike the French and British left (unlike the SFIO, the PCF, or Labour), Italian trade unionism has almost always been anti-colonial, anti-militarist, and opposed to war, even in its reformist tendencies. This stance has held not only during the First and Second World Wars but also against interventions in Libya (1911) and Albania (1918–20), the First Gulf War (1992), and the Middle Eastern wars of the past two decades. Some hesitation, due to contingent necessities, only emerged with Kosovo, and even then, not within FIOM or the left-wing trade union factions. Even at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine three years ago, the CGIL called for a public demonstration (on March 5) with an unequivocal platform, developed alongside the Italian Network for Peace and Disarmament, opposing aggression, NATO expansion, the shipment of weapons and military aid to Ukraine, and advocating for an active neutrality in support of Ukrainian and Russian workers resisting the war. This stance is not only against the logic of war but also against all forms of social militarization. This has been evident in recent months: FLC, FIOM, and FLAI (some categories of the CGIL: Education, Metalworkers and Agricultural) taking the lead in the “No DdL Sicurezza” from its first national assembly at Sapienza University (this is a political and social network against a repressive law of Meloni’s government, involving trade unions, political organizations, antagonistic circuits and social movements). This path has been pursued as an integral part of a broader movement, working on an equal footing with other organizations and social movements. The letter to Repubblica in which Landini announced the CGIL’s participation—but not its endorsement—of the pro-Europe demonstration underscores the union’s commitment to rights, peace, and labor, as well as its vision of a social Europe. However, it also states that Europe must have a strong industrial system, highlighting “the delays and weaknesses of the industrial sector, unable to withstand competition with major global powers.” Most notably, it does not explicitly reject the idea of a common defense, criticizing von der Leyen’s rearmament plan but then adding: “Moreover, these resources and the proposed plan will neither serve to build a European army nor to define a European defense system.” Furthermore, the document for the XIX Congress (Il lavoro crea il futuro) not only emphasizes the need for a profound revision of EU treaties (granting legislative power to the European Parliament, overcoming the unanimity-based decision-making mechanism, and expanding the EU’s institutional competences beyond their current scope) but also calls for financial instruments to mutualize debt (eurobonds) and unconventional monetary policies to support European industrial policies in strategic sectors. Additionally, it states: “The European Union must equip itself with a foreign policy and, consequently, a common defense policy.” In today’s unprecedented context—where the path to a hypothetical federal Europe could start from a common European army and rearmament—the CGIL finds itself caught between differing inclinations. This is also why the internal debate in recent days has been so significant and so emotional.
On March 15, another demonstration was called: “Security lies in rejecting war. No to rearmament in Europe. No to a common defense. No to a war economy. Affection builds new paths to peace.” At Piazza Barberini, in direct opposition to the emphasis on Europe, the priority was placed on opposing war and rearmament. This initiative was spearheaded primarily by ARCI Rome, alongside Attac, PaP, Rifondazione, PCI, USB, and many others. The role of ARCI Rome is particularly noteworthy because, following the unequivocal stance of ARCI’s national leadership (“We believe the priority today is different: no to Rearm Europe”), it explicitly called for an alternative demonstration: “Stop Rearming Europe. Against colonial policies. For a Europe that stands for oppressed peoples. Peace and solidarity against war and austerity.” With the strength of its convictions, ARCI raised a fundamental issue: the priority must be to oppose European rearmament. This is the central thread that allows us to tackle and untangle the complexities of the current situation, defining a political space that is not only important but necessary. Of course, even in this alternative square, there are many different—sometimes contradictory—perspectives. Some pacifists view international organizations and diplomacy as the primary tools for managing relations between states. However, this perspective was unrealistic during the Cold War (when the UN and diplomatic relations were shaped by the US-Soviet conflict), abstract in the era of globalization (where international relations were governed by the hierarchies of the Washington Consensus), and is now incoherent in a world defined by multi-polar competition among declining imperialist powers. At the same time, there is also a neo-campist geopolitical vision, one that supports a supposed opposing bloc to dominant imperialism (the U.S.), seeks multilateral relations with emerging powers, and promotes the dismantling of the European Union in favor of initiatives like a “Mediterranean ALBA” or other cross-regional alliances. Neither of these perspectives is particularly compelling to me. One recalls moments of great mobilization but little real impact (e.g., the huge peace protests of 1938 or the “second world power” demonstrations of 2002). The other perspective abandons any social compass or class perspective, ending up simply supporting one imperialism over another. That said, this demonstration was still crucial: precisely because it made clear its rejection of a federal Europe built on competition and rearmament.
The point, however, is that the divide between the two squares cannot be a barricade: it is not useful today. Those who carry the flag of peace at the demonstration for Europe are, in some way, still trying to subvert that framework, even without openly questioning the priority of the European Union. Above all, many are in neither square, as they do not grasp the centrality of this conflict today, even though they perceive the ambiguities and risks of that Europeanist perspective. The point, then, is that now is the time to plow the field for mass defeatism and anti-militarism. To plow a field means having the ability to overturn widespread perceptions and representations, opening one’s gaze to the emerging yet evident dynamics of international rearmament, the weaving of international blocs, and the escalation of commercial, economic, and military confrontations among the main capitalist poles. To plow a field today means constructing, through political confrontation, public debate, and common sense, the perception that our reality is moving toward a confrontation between imperialist poles, a gradual social militarization, and even processes of mass nationalization. What drives these dynamics is not simply a distorted political will, the irresponsible behavioral automatism of brainless sleepwalkers, or the reckless inclinations of this or that authoritarian leader. Instead, they are directed by the processes of capital accumulation; the need to expand markets and export capital for reproduction; the financialization and the framing of these tendencies by the state, which increasingly positions itself as the supporter, defender, and thus organizer of the capital within its own territory.
If social militarization and rearmament are structural tendencies of our present, then our priority must be to develop a mass defeatist and anti-militarist movement. This process is inevitably in opposition to defining a progressive camp that prioritizes Europe. However, it must also be capable of developing a mass orientation, aiming to bring not only the radical sectors of political and social activism into the struggle against war and rearmament but also the subordinate classes of this country as a whole. That is why, today—at a moment when, for the first time, a debate is emerging within the living forces of the Left and in the common consciousness of broad masses about the dynamics of the present, the prospect of war, and the construction of a European power—we must stand firm in our convictions while also having the patience to explain, the openness to dialogue, and the ability to gradually shift collective perceptions and awareness. This perspective, today as in the past, cannot be based simply on an abstract desire for peace, reliance on diplomacy between ruling classes, or support for capitalist multipolarism. In other words, it cannot be founded on the mere call for “peace” but must instead take concrete action against the dynamics of competition and war. This perspective, today as in the past, must first and foremost rediscover its social roots: its fundamental reasons, which lie in the autonomy of labor. In both relations of production and broader social relations, the collective perception of self-determination for men and women against the imperatives of capital accumulation, the contrast between the general interests of labor and those of capital, serves as the foundation for the working class’s independence from the ruling classes—within their own country, their own continent, and beyond. To rediscover the roots of the labor movement and the union means to reactivate its international and internationalist identity. Opposing the logics of war and nationalist frameworks, it fundamentally challenges the capitalist logic of competition and rivalry. In the autonomy from capital, the defeatism of the subordinate classes is also rediscovered. For this reason, today, as a union and as a union current, it makes sense—following the lead of ARCI nazionale—to emphasize that: “War is already embedded in reality, and the new world order, based on the rule of the strongest and the agreements between the strongest, creates a dramatic scenario… We believe, therefore, that today’s priority is to oppose the European ReArm Plan and, consequently, to defeat the idea that has taken hold over time in our continent: ‘Fortress Europe.’”
