In the past few days, unpresented events have been unfolding in Turkey. The ruling AKP has taken a highly radical move—one that could be described as a constitutional coup—against the main opposition. First, it invalidated the university diploma of İstanbul Mayor and candidate for Presidency E. İmamoğlu, which is required for being elected, then detained 106 people along with him with the accusations of bribery and helping terrorist organizations, dismissed the Istanbul Bar Association’s board, blocked access to universities, and filed a lawsuit to annul CHP’s (Republican People’s Party- Kemalists) most recent elective congress.
Since İmamoğlu’s arrest, social opposition in Turkey has been on its feet for three days. Protests and demonstrations are taking place every day in nearly all major cities. The main opposition party, CHP, has taken to the streets and is actively organizing these actions. However, the strong participation of youth reveals that these protests go beyond the CHP and cannot be reduced solely to the arrest of İmamoğlu. The wall of fear in Turkey is beginning to crumble.
What is Happening?
Following the local electoral victory of CHP and İstanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in the local elections last year, numerous investigations and lawsuits were initiated against both of them. İmamoğlu was sentenced to more than two years in prison for “insulting an election official” (he allegedly called someone a “dumbass”), and there was a request to annul the CHP congress where Özgür Özel was elected, citing irregularities (the hearing is scheduled for April 11). If the courts annul the CHP congress, the regime could appoint a trustee and take control of the opposition party. As a response, CHP announced an extraordinary congress for April 4.
The tension is clearly related to the upcoming presidential elections. A notable incident was the annulment of İmamoğlu’s university diploma, along with 27 others, since there is a legal requirement for presidential candidates to hold a university degree. This decision was made on March 17, targeting İmamoğlu and others who had been transferred as students to Istanbul University and explicitly shows that these attacks are very related with the presidential elections.
According to a constitutional amendment made in 2012 under the AKP government, a president in Turkey can be elected for a maximum of two terms. The current president has already been elected twice. To run again, either an early election must be called or the constitution must be amended to remove or change this provision. However, the AKP and its allied parties do not have enough parliamentary seats to make constitutional amendments. Therefore, the AKP is likely to try to compensate for its declining votes by weakening strong opposition candidates and expanding its alliance by attracting deputies from other parties.
CHP, with its 1.75 million members, decided to hold a primary election, with İmamoğlu as a candidate. However, just four days before the planned primaries on March 23, 2025, İmamoğlu and 106 associates were detained on charges of bribery, embezzlement, and aiding a terrorist organization (because of the “city consensus strategy” that we mentioned before). The arrests of March 19 are a clear attempt of the regime to meddle with the democratic rights of voters.
Background
A significant political event in this process was the effort by CHP to nominate a joint presidential candidate against the AKP (Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party) government, in alliance with five other center and right-wing parties. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of CHP, the largest party in this alliance, lost to the incumbent President Erdoğan in the second round with 47.82% of the vote. Subsequently, in November 2023, Kılıçdaroğlu lost his position as party leader to an alliance between Deputy Leader Özgür Özel and Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu at his party’s congress.
A critical turning point came during the local elections on March 31, 2024, when the CHP surpassed the ruling conservative AKP in total votes for the first time since the 1977 elections, with a margin of over 2%. CHP not only secured a majority in metropolitan municipalities but also won some mayoral positions in Kurdish provinces, albeit in small numbers. A notable aspect of this election was the CHP’s strategy of entering some municipalities with joint lists under the name “city consensus,” particularly with DEM (Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party- a party that receives substantial support from the Kurdish population) and other smaller parties. In major cities, DEM Party candidates won municipal council memberships and various positions through CHP lists, while refraining from nominating their own candidates. Similarly, the CHP did not run under its own banner in over 100 electoral districts.
In Istanbul, the economic locomotive of Turkey and home to over 15 million people, Ekrem İmamoğlu has been serving as the CHP mayor since 2019. In 2019, he defeated the AKP candidate by a margin of 13,000 votes, after which the election was controversially annulled. A few months later, in the re-run election, he increased his margin to 800,000 votes. In the 2024 elections, the gap between him and the closest AKP candidate reached 1 million votes.
Reactions and Protests
CHP, recognizing the growing anger and the beginning of the erosion of the fear barrier that has persisted since the 2015 coup attempt, announced it would not succumb to AKP’s threats and began a vigil at the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality building. The first significant movement came from students of Istanbul University, who, angered by the university administration’s decision to annul İmamoğlu’s diploma, broke through police barricades and reached the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality building where the CHP leader was present.
On the same day, protest actions began in many major cities, and some universities like Middle East Technical University decided to boycott the classes on the third day of the protests.
The protests did not stop on the first day, especially as CHP leader Özgür Özel called on non-CHP members to vote in the primaries scheduled for March 23. The protests, particularly among university students, are becoming increasingly radicalized and widespread. On March 21, Özgür Özel had to explicitly call on the masses to take to the streets.
“We will no longer do politics in conference halls but in the streets.” Özel stated.
For the past three days, protests have been taking place all across Turkey—every day, every hour. The demonstrations intensify especially at night. While the police treat CHP voters somewhat more “gently,” they take a much harsher stance toward young people. Youth are showing up at locations where CHP-led rallies are being held, but they don’t enter the rally areas, choosing instead to stay behind police barricades. After the CHP rallies conclude, police-student chases continue for long hours throughout the night. As of Saturday morning, we learned that 343 students were in custody and access to hundreds of social media accounts belonging to the opposition had been blocked. However, the actual numbers are likely much higher.
Is it Only İmamoğlu?
In the recent period, Turkey has been witnessing a rapid escalation of political, economic, and social tensions. The economic crisis, high inflation, and rising cost of living are profoundly affecting the daily lives of large segments of the population. In addition to economic uncertainties, regulations the government attempts to implement based on conservative – religious motivations are exacerbating political polarization, while trust in political institutions is dwindling. This situation is triggering social unrest and increasing tensions among different groups.
At the same time, the AKP continues to rally its supporters through the narrative of a “strong Turkey,” promising to mitigate the economic crisis by urging patience. Erdoğan assures his voter base that recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East will soon deliver prosperity, appealing to them with messages like, “We must all grit our teeth together for now.”
However, the envisioned “strong Turkey” clearly implies an aggressive stance, potentially including military operations against neighboring countries, such as Syria/Rojava. The backbone of this so-called strength—a military force of around one million—is largely made up of the impoverished youth.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s middle class is rapidly shrinking. Housing and food prices have soared far above international averages, making basic necessities increasingly inaccessible even for middle-income groups. Turkey has become a nation where access to affordable food is a significant challenge, even for the once relatively comfortable middle class. Now, over 70% of the population lives below the poverty threshold, and youth unemployment has surpassed 30%, highlighting a deepening social and economic crisis.
What’s Next?
Meanwhile, it’s essential to highlight the massive economic fallout from AKP’s political crackdown. Since the invalidation of İmamoğlu’s diploma, the Turkish lira began a steep decline against the dollar, euro, and gold, losing at least 10% of its value immediately following İmamoğlu’s imprisonment. The stock exchange was halted twice, plummeting to a historic low. Although financial authorities attempted to stabilize the currency by selling 12 billion dollars from reserves (according to FT), these measures ultimately proved ineffective. However, it’s unclear if the AKP government will take into account the economic collapse and if this will play a role in toning down their aggressive policies if the deterioration continues. It seems that they will continue to try to fool their base with the “strong Turkey” story, since they have left no room to go backwards.
It is almost certain that millions will vote in favor of İmamoğlu as the presidential candidate in the primaries. However, the streets have already begun to transcend institutional politics. The detention of İmamoğlu, seen as an attempt to obstruct the right to vote, has been the last straw (and a big one, for sure). The accumulated anger and rapidly deepening poverty and insecurity are paving the way for the end of the AKP. Currently, the CHP is the strongest alternative to the AKP. However, it has limited its discourse to democracy, freedom of expression, and the right to vote, and is not adopting the radical stance demanded by the youth and the majority of people on the streets, since they perceive this uprising merely as a demonstration of the people’s demand for democracy, rather than the beginning of a struggle for equality—two aspects that, in their true meaning, cannot be separated from each other.
For the AKP, this could be their final move. If it does not arrest İmamoğlu, annul the CHP congress, or appoint a trustee to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, it is entering a battle it is likely to lose. However, the realization of all these moves would mean an increase in pressure and, very likely, resistance. Under AKP rule, the peoples of Turkey (especially the youth) have little left to lose but their chains.
